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Preface 
 
 This study of space deterrence was produced over the course of a year by the staff of the 
Eisenhower Center, benefiting from the comments of individuals from all sectors of the space 
community.   We want especially to thank Col. Patrick Frakes for the material and intellectual 
support that made the study possible. 
 
 The political atmosphere of space policy is dynamic, and any study like ours must 
represent our best judgment at a moment in time.   Were we to revise our judgments in light of 
events since this study took on final form, we might well put less emphasis on economic 
entanglement as a factor in deterring attacks on U.S. space assets.   The economic crisis of 2008-
2009 can be seen as a test of the depth of that entanglement.    The economic distress has been 
widespread and has demonstrated the mutual dependence of large economies in a globalized 
world.   But some countries have weathered the downturn much better than others.   In particular, 
the Chinese economy seems to have bounced rapidly back in spite of a substantial fall off of 
demand from the United States, perhaps because of the cushion of two trillion dollars in reserves 
built up over the previous decade.  This would indicate that damage to the international financial 
system created by interruptions of space services might well have greater impact on the United 
States than on some possible space competitors, and consequently that the deterrent effect of 
globalization on hostilities in space, instead impacting all space faring nations equally as our 
study implies, might be more keenly felt in the United States.    The moral seems to be that 
prudent financial management – or its lack – will always affect national power, in space no less 
than elsewhere. 
 
 Readers will doubtless find other areas in which our judgments might be challenged, as 
some of the commentators we include in this follow certainly did.    Our conviction was and 
remains that no discussion of a topic like space deterrence can begin until someone throws the 
gauntlet.  That we have tried to do here, stating our conclusions as forcefully as we can in the 
hope that this approach will stimulate thinking by others and prove useful to policy makers. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Roger G. Harrison, Ph.D. 
Allan & Malcolm Lockheed and Glenn L. Martin Professor  
 Director, Eisenhower Center for Space & Defense Studies  
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Roger G. Harrison, Deron R. Jackson, and Collins G. Shackelford 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
Executive Summary 
  
The United States has created a military 
structure that is heavily satellite-dependent, 
without making corresponding improvements 
in the survivability of its space systems.  The 
result is a classic opportunity for asymmetric, 
preemptive attack.  The central question of 
this study is how to structure a strategy of 
deterrence to persuade potentially hostile 
actors that the costs of attack will nevertheless 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
There is little to be gained from attacks in 
space unless they translate into strategic or 
tactical advantage within the atmosphere.   
Space and terrestrial deterrence are therefore 
inextricably linked.  If space deterrence is not 
credible – i.e. if an aggressor perceives that he 
can critically disable U.S. air, ground and sea 
forces by a preemptive attack in space – 
terrestrial deterrence is weakened.   If, on the 
other hand, he perceives that a preemptive 
attack in space will not yield a decisive 
tactical or strategic advantage, both space and 
terrestrial deterrence are strengthened. 
     
Although the body of strategic analysis that 
structured Cold War deterrence provides a 
                                                
This study was conducted by the Eisenhower Center for 
Space and Defense Studies of the United States Air Force 
Academy. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 
expressed or implied in this report are those of its authors, and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air Force 
Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, nor any 
other agency of the United States Government. For questions 
or comments about this study, address correspondence to the 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, HQ 
USAFA/DFPS, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6L16, United 
States Air Force Academy, Colorado 80840, (719) 333-1745 
(telephone), Roger.Harrison@usafa.edu (e-mail). 
foundation as well for a study of deterrence in 
space, factors unique to space make the 
conclusions reached in that earlier era 
suggestive rather than determinative.  Among 
those unique factors are some that make the 
task of deterrence in space less difficult than 
nuclear deterrence, others that complicate it.  
For example, Cold War deterrence assumed a 
rough equality of capability and risk between 
the superpowers.  The same assumption 
cannot be made in space.  The U.S. is 
uniquely capable there, but also uniquely 
vulnerable.  The threat of retaliation was the 
centerpiece of Cold War deterrence.  It is 
more problematic in space because, among 
other things, of difficulty of attribution of 
attack. There was scope in the Cold War for 
exploitation of various defensive strategies, 
including hardening, mobility and eventually 
ballistic missile defense.  Defensive options 
also exist in space, but are more limited and 
may compromise capability.  On the other 
hand, a failure of deterrence in space, although 
it would have profound military 
consequences, is not an existential threat to 
the United States. There is no space analogue 
to the Cold War policy of mutual assured 
destruction.   
 
The most effective space deterrence posture is 
therefore one that draws on the strengths of 
several forms of deterrence while avoiding the 
weakness (in the space environment) of each 
in isolation.  Thus, a space deterrence posture 
is stronger which confronts an adversary with 
the early imposition of unacceptable political 
and economic costs, presents a credible threat 
of certain retaliation, and ultimately persuades 
him that he will be denied the benefit of 
attack.  A deterrence posture is stronger when 
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it forces an adversary to compete across a 
range of capabilities – air, sea, land, undersea, 
cyber and space – than when it allows him a 
decisive advantage by competing successfully 
in area of operations, i.e. space.  Politically, a 
deterrence posture is stronger if it is credible 
to adversaries and enhances consensus 
building among allies.  It is stronger if, in 
crisis, it satisfies the requirements of the 
military leadership for decisiveness, and the 
demand of political leaders for flexibility.   
 
Deterrence will seldom be optimized in all 
these variables.  Trade-offs – the balance of 
risk we use as our title – will be necessary.   
For example, decision makers may be willing 
to accept stronger international norms in 
space, and the resulting restrictions on U.S. 
freedom of action, if the alternative is an anti-
satellite (ASAT) arms race in space.  
International norms, including arms control, 
are inherently difficult to verify in space, and 
perhaps impossible to verify in the case of 
ground-based electromagnetic weapons of the 
sort most likely to be used in future to negate 
U.S. space capability.  Moreover, the prudent 
assumption would be that an adversary will 
attempt to negate space services just at those 
times and on those fields of battle where they 
are most necessary.   Accordingly, a robust 
strategy of deterrence by denial will require a 
credible U.S. strategy to “fight through” any 
attempt to deny space services to its forces.   
This means multiplying the sources of those 
services both in space and within the 
atmosphere, and considering in advance what 
to do if the screen goes blank.  
 
Even the strongest deterrence strategy is not a 
guarantee against attack.  Still, a deterrence 
posture based on strengthened military 
capabilities and broadened international 
engagement should provide a greater measure 
of security and stability in space, even as the 
entry of new space-faring powers like the 
PRC, and the reemergence as a possible 
military competitor of the Russian Federation, 
raise the specter of space as a “contested” 
environment. A layered deterrence framework 
offers the prospect of responding to changes in 
the dynamic space security environment 
including a perceived “vulnerability gap,” the 
growing number of space powers, and the 
potentially contested nature of space.  
 
We have set a time horizon of twenty years, 
about the span necessary to develop and 
deploy two generations of satellites, i.e. 
sufficient time for the full range of potential 
threats to develop, and for the United States to 
respond with changes to the design and 
deployment of potential offensive and/or 
defensive counter measures.  Our intent is not 
to create consensus, but to spark debate.  
Finally, this study is not a threat analysis.  
Threat is assumed here for purposes of 
argument.   Whether in fact our satellite 
capabilities face a threat sufficient to justify 
adoption of the measures recommended here 
is the subject for a different study, and 
decision for national security decision makers. 
 
Section I:  Introduction and Terms of 
Reference 
 
Deterrence in general is a process by which 
decision makers of a hostile entity are 
persuaded that the costs of attacking a U.S. 
asset or interest will outweigh the benefits. 
They may be persuaded by the likely effects 
of an attack on other national interests, the 
certainty of the threat of retaliation, or by 
uncertainty of ultimate success.1     
                                                
1 Deterrence requires that an adversary accept the 
inevitability of a string of consequences arising from 
his initial attack – i.e. that he envision (in the same way 
we do) the likely situation at D+1, D+2 and so on, with 
D as the circumstance just before the initial attack.  
Rationally, we realize that the situation at D arises from 
a host of variables, some known, some unknown, some 
within our control and some not.   We arbitrarily 
designate a subset of these variables as determinative 
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Space deterrence is defined here as a policy or 
process that deters direct attacks on U.S. 
satellites in orbit with the goal of permanently 
disabling them or temporarily disrupting their 
operation.  We recognize that the functioning 
of satellites can also be disrupted by cyber 
attacks or attacks on ground stations.  
Deterrence of cyber attacks directed at space 
assets is an element of cyber deterrence 
                                                
 
and assume that manipulation of these few will allow us 
to manipulate the overall system to serve our interest.  
We assume that our adversary sees the same variables 
as determinative, since deterrence depends on his 
perception, not ours.  If deterrence succeeds, the policy 
is judged effective, though the absence of attack may be 
coincidental.  If deterrence fails, the situation at D+1 
(the next decision point for policy makers) is invariably 
different than the situation we envisioned in advance. 
The number of variables affected as we move from D to 
D+1, and the magnitude of the impact, cannot be 
predicted.  That truism is reflected in time honored 
military bromide: the plan of battle never survives the 
first exchange of fire.   The incalculability expands 
infinitely at the imaginary D+2, and so on.   Games and 
simulations are designed to bridge the gap between 
imagination and reality by testing the conception of 
future events against realistic scenarios played out 
either by computers or – more usefully – by human 
beings.   But simulations are a limited tool for at least 
three reasons:  the players realize that there are no real 
world consequences to their acts; bias may be 
introduced by the game designer or sponsor, and no 
player can accurately reflect the possible adversary 
except as he is conceived by ‘our side’. The question 
therefore arises: how do we make realistic projections 
about the consequences of the failure of deterrence, as 
we have to if we are to persuade a possible attacker that 
those consequences will be negative for him?  The first 
answer is that incalculability is itself a deterrent.  If a 
potential attacker cannot make a reasonable assessment 
of the likelihood of success of an attack, he will be less 
likely to launch one.  But a more accurate answer may 
be this: that the point is not that the predicted sequence 
of events is realistic, but that it is persuasive – initially 
within our bureaucracy and then with possible 
adversaries.  Ronald Reagan’s projection of a ballistic 
missile shield was not realistic, but it was persuasive, so 
much so that it caused the Soviets to reassess their 
advantage in the strategic balance with the United 
States. 
generally and therefore beyond the scope of 
this paper.   Deterring attacks on ground 
stations by either hostile states or terrorist 
organizations is more properly dealt with in a 
study of conventional deterrence.  It poses the 
same challenges and should be considered in 
the same context as attacks on other 
communication nodes, electrical grids, water 
systems and other elements of the terrestrial 
infrastructure.  
  
Nuclear deterrence theory evolved in the Cold 
War with the help of game theory, which 
claims to apply to any situation in which there 
are two or more competitive players.2  We will 
argue that some of the concepts developed to 
strengthen deterrence in the Cold War are 
applicable as well to a “contested” space 
environment.  On the other hand, space as a 
strategic area of operations is unique.    
Analogies to Cold War nuclear standoff are 
therefore suggestive, but not conclusive.  Our 
task here has been to identify in what ways 
space is unique and what particular challenges 
it presents for U.S. deterrence strategy. 
 
The question of deterrence arises now because 
the overarching conception of the U.S. 
position in space has evolved from “space 
control” in the Clinton Administration, to 
“unhindered freedom of action in the 
Administration of President Bush to 
“contested space” now.3  Precise definitions of 
                                                
2 The most recent of this process, updating it to the 
present is “Deterrence: From the Cold War to the Long 
War, RAND Project Air Force 2008, available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_M
G636.pdf  Our title is a variation on Albert 
Wohlstetter’s seminal RAND study “The Delicate 
Balance of Terror” of 1958 adapted, in our case, to a 
circumstance in which much – but not as much – is at 
stake if deterrence fails. 
3 “Contested” space is not a phrase that appears in the 
Bush Space Policy Document, but is used to 
characterize our current situation by AFSPACE 
commander Kehler, among others.  The Clinton Space 
Policy document is summarized at 
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what constitutes ‘contested space’ – i.e. who is 
contesting space, how they are contesting it 
and what precisely is being contested – have 
not been universally agreed.   But we can 
safely assume that whatever contested space 
is, it is something less than either control or 
dominance, and therefore describes a situation 
in which others will have the capability to 
destroy or disrupt U.S. satellites in orbit, and 
will have to be deterred from using that 
capability. 
 
The Deterrence Operations Joint Operating 
Concept (DOJOC)4 study of 2006 concludes 
that the goal of deterrence strategy must be to 
exercise “decisive influence” on the decision 
making processes of a potential attacker. 5  In 
fact, deterrence by nature can never be as 
absolute as the phrase “decisive influence” 
implies.    Deterrence depends on the 
decisions of actors who are outside our direct 
control and whose perceptions of costs and 
benefits may differ from ours.  They may 
underestimate our capability or our resolve; 
they may react emotionally or unpredictably.  
Their decision process probably will be 
opaque to us and perhaps to them as well.   In 
sum, no deterrence policy can reduce the risk 
of attack to zero, and no national strategic 
policy should rely exclusively on deterrence 
for national defense.  Still, deterrence is an 
element of any national security strategy, and 
it is relevant to consider what actions are 
                                                
 
http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf and the Bush Space 
Policy document is at 
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%
20Policy.pdf  
4 See www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ 
do_joc_v20.doc 
5 Decisive influence is the sort of term that emerges 
from the dynamics of bureaucratic consensus building.  
It sounds more robust than mere “influence” but not so 
infeasible as “control”   Still, control is what is implies, 
i.e. that we can intervene – directly and indirectly - with 
decisive effect. 
likely to make deterrence more robust and 
what actions may weaken it.  
 
It might be thought that adequacy of 
deterrence is established by the absence of 
attack.     But some would argue that the 
absence of attack means only that adversaries 
perceive no present need for it, not that they 
are inhibited by our policy.   Perceptions of 
this sort are a function of an individual’s 
reading of history, view of conflict, 
experience of the world, bureaucratic 
responsibility and/or conclusions about human 
nature, among other things.  The same can be 
said of the various schools of thought about 
the likelihood of conflict in space; Hays 
(following Lupton) describes four such 
schools,6 Mueller seven7 – ranging from 
inevitable conflict to space as sanctuary. 
 
Theories multiply in the absence of 
experience.  The United States has never 
fought a battle or even a skirmish in space.  It 
has never faced an opponent with more than 
limited offensive capability against its 
satellites.  In that circumstance, a divergence 
of points of view about the nature of any 
eventual conflict – and appropriate measures 
to avoid it - is inevitable. We conclude that no 
consensus is likely on the adequacy of space 
deterrence, and no study of this sort should be 
aimed at creating one.   The present study 
avoids that danger in favor of an entirely 
different goal:  a concept of space deterrence 
useful to decision makers that takes into 
account the constraints which surround them, 
in particular restraints on available resources. 
 
 
                                                
6 Hays, Peter L. United States Military Space Into the 
Twenty-First Century: INSS Occasional Paper, 42, Air 
University Press, September, 2002, pp. 11-12. 
7 As cited in Moltz, James Clay, The Politics of Space 
Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of 
National Interests, Stanford Security Studies, 2008, pp. 
23-24. 
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 Section II:  Methodology, Terminology, 
and Premises 
 
This study is based on open source material.  
While it is prudent to assume that space is 
technologically dynamic, what programs may 
exist in the United States or elsewhere with 
the potential to change the existing strategic 
situation in space is necessarily unknown to 
us.  Even the most basic of our assumptions – 
that space is, on balance, offense dominant – 
is subject to change because of technological 
innovation.  However, a deterrence strategy 
that is effective when offense is dominant will 
be even more so if the balance swings more 
toward defense.9  We therefore take the worst 
case as our starting point. 
                                                
9Robert Jervis’ seminal study of the Offense-Defense 
balance serves as our guide, “Cooperation Under the 
Security Dilemma” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 
(January 1978), pp. 186-214.  The classic security 
dilemma, outlined by Rousseau and others, holds that 
an increase in one state’s security decreases the security 
of others, since a state’s intentions about the use of that 
security apparatus can never be known if the 
capabilities are inherently defensive of offensive.  
Jervis clarifies the security dilemma for us by 
highlighting two crucial variables, whether defensive 
weapons can be easily distinguished from offensive 
ones and which of the two has an advantage on the 
battlefield.  In Jervis’ language, “offense has the 
advantage when it is easier to destroy the other’s army 
and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own.  
When defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect 
and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and 
take.  If effective defenses can be erected quickly, an 
attacker may be able to keep territory.”  Jervis ultimate 
argues that the security dilemma is most problematic 
when offensive and defensive postures are 
indistinguishable and when offense has the advantage. 
We began our research with the notion that 
game theory might give a structure to 
consideration of space deterrence.  The 
advantage of game theory is that it purports to 
be “scientific” – i.e., to provide an objective 
standard for judgment amid the thicket of 
ideological preconceptions that otherwise 
dominate discussions of space security.  As 
the study progressed, our confidence in game 
theory as a useful tool waned.  Game theory 
presumes rational actors and the DOJOC 
study assumes that “truly irrational actors are 
extremely rare.”  However, the history of 
strategic policy is replete with examples of 
nominally rational actors behaving irrationally 
– because of flawed intelligence, ideological 
preconceptions, leadership dynamics, time 
pressure, bureaucratic interest, personal 
rivalry, lack of experience and poor judgment, 
among other reasons.10  We know these 
elements of irrationality are true of ourselves, 
and can reasonably impute them to others.11 
 
What remains of game theory in this 
document is therefore the barest essentials:  
that a contest in which the offense has the 
advantage will tend to be less stable and more 
                                                
10This notion also ignores the ‘crazy man’ theory of 
deterrence, i.e. convincing an opponent that your 
possible reaction is terrifying precisely because it is not 
predictably rational (Schelling and others).  Kissinger 
employed a variant of this approach without notable 
success in his dealings with the North Vietnamese.   
 
11 Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard 
University Press, 1960, makes the classic case for 
allowing the “weak” rational actor assumption, 
particularly on pgs. 16-18.  He argues that it is better to 
think about rational individuals as those having the 
ability to conduct strategic interactions, that is, those 
with the ability who try to get something they want with 
the knowledge that another actor is trying to acquire the 
same thing.  As Milton Friedman argues, assumptions 
of rationality should be assessed on the benefits and 
clarity they produced in their analyses, not on how 
emotionally stable an actor might be. “The 
Methodology of Positive Economics.” Essays in 
Positive Economics University of Chicago, 1953.  
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prone to escalation, than a contest in which 
defense predominates; that adversaries will 
seek to exploit an opponent’s vulnerabilities 
rather than attack his strengths; that successful 
deterrence depends on convincing a potential 
attacker that the costs of attack will outweigh 
the benefits.12  These are the dictates not only 
of game theory but of common sense, and at 
least as venerable as the writings of Sun Tzu 
and Thucydides. 
 
Nomenclature can and does bias consideration 
of space security, which is often characterized 
by imprecision of language, the confusion of 
metaphor for reality and the use of political 
mobilizing slogans in place of analysis.  Much 
dispute has raged, for example, around the 
question of space militarization and/or 
weaponization - terms that have become 
politically-charged code words for contending 
points of view about the future of space.13   
Some argue that space is already militarized, 
and that the only issue now is how the U.S. 
should deploy its space military capability to 
best advantage.  Others contend that although 
space has been used for intelligence and other 
                                                
12 These “game theoretic” properties are well 
established in the contemporary rational choice 
literature.  See Robert Powell’s “Uncertainty, Shifting 
Power, and Appeasement,” American Political Science 
Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 749-64, 
Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal’s “Rational 
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 
World Politics 41 (September 1989), pp. 143-169, 
James Fearon’s “Selection Effects and Deterrence.” 
International Interactions 28, 1 (January-March 2000): 
5-29 and Barry Nalebuff’s “Rational Deterrence In An 
Imperfect World.” World Politics 43, April 1991, pp.  
313-335. 
13 For the view that space is already weaponized, see 
Everett Carl Dolman, “Space Power and U.S. 
Hegemony: Maintaining a liberal Order in the 21st 
Century” available at http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/ 
spaceforum/Dolmanpaper%5B1%5D.pdf 
Teresa Hitchens gives an opposing view “U.S. Policy: 
Time to Stop and Think”  http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/27b/049.html, but she also thinks 
inevitable that “weapons will inevitably go into space”. 
military purposes, there remains a political 
barrier to weaponization that the U.S. should 
not be the first to cross.   Our study will not 
end this controversy – or even refer to it 
beyond this short description.   Instead we will 
concentrate exclusively on those acts or 
policies which can strengthen or weaken 
deterrence without regard to how they may be 
characterized, attempting to discover whether 
they are 1) feasible, 2) affordable, 3) in the 
strategic interest of the United States, and 4) 
sustainable and effective in the presence of 
foreseeable  adversary counter measures. 
 
As mentioned above, we assume in this 
document that offense is dominant in space.  
We note as well, however, that this dominance 
is theoretical rather than actual because the 
weapons that might establish it, although 
technologically feasible, are not – as far as we 
can determine – presently deployed.   The 
assumption of offense dominance rests on the 
notion that it is easier and cheaper to add a 
unit of offense in space than it is to add a unit 
of defense.14  Later in this study we discuss the 
problems with defense, especially of large 
satellites that form the backbone of U.S. space 
capability.  Other modes of deployment are 
emerging which could perform many of the 
same functions as existing satellites but be 
inherently resilient to attack.   New forms of 
offense may also emerge.   In short, within the 
twenty-year timeframe of this study, the 
offense-defense equation may change.   
                                                
14The “Nitze criteria” for cost-effective missile defense 
establishes the notion of a defense-dominant 
environment as one in which defense measures must be 
“cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so 
that the other side has no incentive to add additional 
offensive capability to overcome the defense.”   We 
assume that that criterion cannot be satisfied in space, 
i.e. that it is cheaper, technologically more feasible and 
easier to add a unit of offense to overcome any 
incremental improvement in defense.  See: “On the 
Road to a more Stable Peace” 
Department of Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Current Policy No. 657, 20 February 1985. 
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Insofar as it changes in the direction of 
defense, deterrence becomes a less important 
subject; so we assume for purposes of this 
study that offense will retain its 
predominance. 
 
Some will object that our emphasis on 
services to the war fighter within the 
atmosphere ignores the potential for conflict 
in space over the raw materials that may exist 
on the moon and various other celestial 
bodies.   Such conflicts are very unlikely in 
the timeframe of this study.   Even looking out 
fifty or one-hundred years, the notion that raw 
materials might be mined economically in 
space for use on the surface – and that nations 
would fight, for example, over the best sectors 
of space or the moon to exploit for this 
purpose–is open to serious doubt.15  Exploiting 
raw materials in space for use in space may be 
a more economically viable option; but it is 
not a near or even medium term prospect, and 
no business case has been made to attract the 
billions in investment capital it would require.  
What is and will increasingly be in short 
supply in space are orbital position and 
bandwidth – both now allocated by 
international agreement.  The allocation is 
imperfect and subject to much dispute;  such 
dispute will probably increase as more nations 
jockey for position in space.  On the other 
hand, neither orbital position nor bandwidth  
lends itself to control by force majeure.  Some 
commentators believe that the U.S. potentially 
has, or could develop, the power to allocate 
these scarcities according to its own interests, 
                                                
15  Exploiting resources in space for use in space could 
only be describe as economic when compared to the 
cost of launching such resources to space from the 
surface.   No one has devised a convincing business 
case for either model.  In general, economic theories 
about wealth creation in space ignore principles of 
comparative advantage and opportunity costs, 
underestimate the capital required, and overestimate the 
return to be expected.   
but no U.S. administration has taken that 
view, and none is likely to do so.16 
 
Our study assumes that the list of potential 
actors with both the motive and the capability 
of contesting with the United States in space is 
small, and unlikely to expand greatly over the 
next twenty years.   More importantly for 
space deterrence, those potential adversaries 
are nation states with things of value that can 
be held at risk.  Terrorists might exploit 
weaknesses in cyber defense to launch attacks 
that include space assets, but that threat is 
defined by the prospects for cyber terrorism 
generally.  A terrorist state with space 
capability might attempt attacks on U.S. 
assets, particularly in connection with 
terrestrial hostilities.   Some see emerging 
Iranian space capability as an example of this 
threat.  It cannot be discounted.  But terrorist 
states are still states with things of value to 
hold at risk, and therefore subject to 
deterrence by a variety of means.   The central 
problem of the war on terror – that the 
adversary is irrational, fanatical and 
undeterred by any threat - is therefore unlikely 
to arise as a problem hampering space 
deterrence. 
 
Finally, our analysis is based on the 
assumption of limited budget resources.  If we 
assume substantial increases in budgets for 
military space, the United States can mount 
programs to deal with whatever threats the 
imagination can conjure.  Whether such 
programs would succeed, of course, is a 
different matter; but all things could be 
attempted.  In the period like that immediately 
ahead, on the other hand, policy makers will 
have to distinguish between the probable and 
the possible treats, and emphasize cost 
effectiveness and comparative advantage.   In 
                                                
16 This argument is made, for example, by Everett 
Dolman, “Space Power and U.S. Hegemony: 
Maintaining a Liberal World Order in the 21st Century.” 
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the words of Lord Rutherford: “We have no 
money, so we must think.” 
 
Section III:  Deterrence and Space 
 
Space deterrence differs from Cold War 
nuclear deterrence in several ways. Among 
these are some distinctions that make the task 
of space deterrence less difficult and some that 
complicate it. 
 
Cold War Deterrence 
 
From the time in the late 1960’s when the 
Soviet Union achieved rough parity with the 
United States in nuclear arms, deterrence from 
the point of view of US policy makers shifted 
from a reliance on retaliation alone, to an 
interplay of retaliation and denial.  
 
The key concern of policy makers was the 
possibility of a preemptive nuclear first strike 
that would destroy U.S. nuclear retaliatory 
capability.  The U.S response to this threat 
took the form of a  series of measures to 
ensure the survivability of the nuclear 
deterrent,  including hardening of ICBM silos, 
24-hour airborne alerts by bomber forces, and 
increased reliance on less vulnerable systems 
like mobile launchers (for intermediate range 
missiles) and submarine launched ballistic 
missiles.   The concept of the deterrence 
“triad” of land-based, air and sea-based 
nuclear weapons arises from this period as do 
the key doctrines that came to define Cold 
War nuclear and conventional strategy: 
ensured second-strike capability, flexible 
response, escalation dominance, defense in 
depth, rapid reinforcement, and survivable 
C3I.  All were elements to support a strategy 
of deterrence by denial, designed to convince 
our Cold War adversary that there was no 
permanent advantage to be gained at any level 
of conflict, whether conventional or nuclear. 
 
Deterrence by entanglement – economic 
interdependence for example - played little 
role in this era.  The autarkic impulse of 
Soviet leadership and the containment policies 
of the U.S. and its allies worked together to 
isolate the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
countries economically from the world 
economy, making deterrence by entanglement 
minimal.   
 
Deterrence by international norms, including 
arms control, was more important, albeit not 
always positive from the point of view of the 
U.S.  The Soviets pursued a consistent 
strategy of promoting international norms and 
multilateral arms control agreements designed 
to restrict U.S. options, including repeated 
initiatives to ban nuclear first strike as well as 
general and complete disarmament proposals.   
These were the subject of much diplomatic 
maneuvering, but had little practical effect.  
Later in the Cold War, bilateral and 
substantive arms control agreements came to 
play a key role.  
 
The likelihood that the nuclear arms race 
would not result in a decisive advantage for 
either side began to be apparent in the 1960s.   
Accordingly, the United States initiated a 
parallel process designed to reach an 
equilibrium point in U.S. and Soviet 
conventional and nuclear arms, beginning 
with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in the 
Kennedy Administration.  The search for 
equilibrium led to a series of arms control 
negotiations: limitation (SALT) and then 
reduction (START) of overall strategic 
arsenals, mutual (the United States added 
“balanced”) conventional reductions in 
Europe (MBFR), and elimination in Europe of 
intermediate range nuclear forces (INF).  The 
Reagan Administration energetically pursued 
the notion of equilibrium at much lower levels 
of nuclear arms, a goal symbolized by 
Reagan’s decision that what had been nuclear 
limitation negotiations (SALT) should be re-
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designated nuclear reduction negotiations 
(START).  
 
As space operations became more important 
to overall military capability, both the Soviets 
and the United States developed and deployed 
kinetic kill ASAT systems.  Both unilaterally 
abandoned those systems, which did not play 
an important role in the overall military 
balance between the two countries.   A 
number of technologies which might have 
brought additional offensive space capability – 
neutron beam weapons, orbiting rail guns – 
were not pursued. Indeed, even at the height 
of the Cold War each side refrained from 
interference with the other’s space capability, 
a tacit agreement that was formalized in later 
nuclear arms control treaties in provisions 
banning interference with national technical 
means of verification (NTM).17   
 
Moltz argues that these developments were by 
no means inevitable, but dependent on 
individuals and circumstance.18  Still, it is 
possible to conclude that each side saw more 
value in maintaining its own capability than in 
destroying the capability of the other side.  
This was true as well of the Soviets, in spite of 
the existence in those years of relative 
superiority of U.S. military space.  In Moltz’ 
words, both sides desired “stability more than 
superiority.”19 
 
Cold War deterrence was successful.  The 
equilibrium that emerged, although certainly 
imperfect, has proven durable, at least by the 
standards of great power competition.   Even 
                                                
17 Non-interference with “national technical means” 
became codified in the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (Article V).  The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(Article XII) specified the role of NTM for verification 
and precluded parties from interfering with or 
undertaking measures that would conceal or otherwise 
impede verification via NTM. 
18 Moltz, p. 50. 
19 Ibid. p. 56. 
with the tensions of U.S. anti-missile 
deployments to Eastern Europe, and Russian 
threats to abrogate the INF treaty, the U.S. 
continues to reduce its arsenal of deployed 
nuclear warheads.  No one now imagines a 
second nuclear arms race anything like the 
first.    Other nuclear powers, like the Chinese, 
seem content with limited arsenals. 
 
Unique Challenges of the Space 
Environment 
 
Cold War deterrence – both within the 
atmosphere and in space - was ultimately 
based on symmetry of capability and of risk.   
The two sides each had the capability to 
destroy the other; neither could entirely ensure 
itself against that danger.   This balance was 
most graphically represented in the doctrine of 
“mutual assured destruction” and the “balance 
of terror” - key elements of nuclear deterrence 
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff (and 
fuel the search for an equilibrium point) but 
have no direct analogue in space.   
 
On the contrary, space deterrence is seen to 
present particular issues because the U.S. is 
now uniquely dependent on space assets for its 
military capability and therefore potentially 
subject to asymmetric attacks in space.   This 
is the so-called “vulnerability gap”.  Since no 
potential adversary would have as much at 
stake as the United States in a generalized 
offensive war in space, the task of deterrence 
is seemingly more difficult – some would say, 
impossible.  This problem has been 
recognized at least since studies in the 1970s, 
but the emergence of net centric war and the 
Revolution in Military Affairs have increased 
dependence and therefore at least in theory 
incentive for hostile attack.20 
                                                
20 The 1975 Schlichter Report and the 1976 Buchsbaum 
Panel both cited the growing dependence of U.S. forces 
on satellites vulnerable to Soviet attack.  Both pointed 
to the dangers of an ASAT arms race.  The Buchsbaum 
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Space deterrence may also be seen as 
problematic because two potential deterrence 
strategies – deterrence by threat of retaliation 
and by denial (including defense) - present 
theoretical difficulties in space.  This is 
particularly true if space is seen as a area of 
operations in itself with a separate military 
balance independent of the balance within the 
atmosphere.  Finally, space deterrence is seen 
as problematic because of gaps in our 
situational awareness, in particular  our ability 
to distinguish between intentional and 
unintentional interference, i.e. between a 
hostile action (perhaps disguised) and the 
consequences of operating in a harsh and 
electromagnetically active environment. 
 
In short, we identify four central issues that 
must be addressed by any coherent doctrine of 
space deterrence: 
 
• The “vulnerability gap” in space 
• The difficulty of defending space 
assets 
• The credibility of retaliation in an 
asymmetric environment 
• The weaknesses of space situational 
awareness (SSA) and attribution of 
attack 
 
Vulnerability Gap 
 
That a vulnerability gap exists is not disputed. 
The United States has created a military 
structure which is heavily satellite-dependent, 
without making corresponding improvements 
in the survivability of those satellites in a 
hostile environment.  The result is a classic 
                                                
 
Panel did not see U.S. assets as a viable deterrent but 
did conclude they might have potential use as a 
bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets on 
ASAT arms control.  For a review, see 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-
18/au18003e.htm  
opportunity for asymmetric, preemptive 
attack. Because of the vulnerability gap, an 
adversary might assume that even if the origin 
of an attack in space were known and the U.S. 
retaliated in kind by destroying (even 
disproportionately) the enemy’s space assets, 
he would nonetheless gain by the exchange 
since overall U.S. military capability – more 
dependent than his on space - would be 
disproportionately degraded.  
 
Some believe that this gap will narrow of 
itself as the militaries of potential adversaries 
modernized and become more dependent on 
satellites.21    It is just as likely, in our 
judgment, that other space-faring nations will 
see our example as one to avoid rather than 
emulate.  They may be alert to the distinction 
between reliance and over-reliance on space, 
and less certain of the value added space 
provides in the sort of wars they are likely to 
fight.  They may take advantage of emerging 
technologies to deploy space assets in 
inherently more defensible modes – rather 
than committing to vulnerable satellites that 
will still be operating two decades and more 
from now. Our reliance on space is fueled in 
part by our desire for global reach.  Our most 
likely competitors are – at least for the 
moment – geographically less ambitious and 
therefore less in need of space assets to enable 
far distant military campaigns.  Nor can we 
rely on them to follow our example of net 
centric war.   Who else, for example, is likely 
to devote assets to creating a global 
communication grid?   Even if potential 
adversaries mirror our military space 
strategies, they are unlikely to become as 
dependent on space as we are, and the 
vulnerability gap is therefore unlikely to 
narrow significantly.  Nor are we likely to 
                                                
21Bruce W. MacDonald describes the potential 
narrowing of the vulnerability gap in: “China, Space 
Weapons and U.S. Security,” Council of Foreign 
Relations Special Report Number 38, p. 4.  
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achieve the sort of “space control” that would 
give us assured superiority in every 
circumstance.  
 
As well, it is usually a mistake to adopt 
strategies that depend for their success on the 
cooperation of potential adversaries.  Those 
who will potentially contest with us in space 
have no interest in reducing our vulnerability 
there, or increasing their own.  Mirror imaging 
of military capability is known in PRC 
strategic circles, for example, as falling into 
the “Soviet trap.”22  The problems posed by 
the vulnerability gap for U.S. space and 
strategic policy are real.   But they can only be 
addressed by our actions and policies, and not 
by relying on the actions of others.  
 
The effect of the vulnerability gap on the 
effectiveness of deterrence may not, however, 
be as great as this analysis would indicate.   
Classic nuclear deterrence theory demands 
that we hold at risk things of value to an 
opponent.  We have assumed for forty years 
that value equates to utility, and since we 
depend more on satellites for our military 
reach, the value we attribute to them is 
correspondingly higher.   But foreign actors 
may value satellites far above their immediate 
utility – as potential economic growth 
multipliers, symbols of national progress, as 
tools of political control, or as tokens of status 
given the military in return for military 
obedience.  This may be true in particular of 
the PRC, but cannot be discounted in the case 
of other emerging space-faring nations.   In 
short, although our military vulnerability in 
space is greater, the value gap may not be so 
great.  The threat of retaliation in kind, even in 
a situation where the U.S. is asymmetrically 
                                                
22 Paul J. Bolt and Adam K. Gray, “China’s National 
Security Strategy,” paper presented at the December 
2007 Air Force Institute for National Security Studies 
Conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
vulnerable in terms of capability at stake, may 
therefore play a substantial deterrent role. 
 
Difficulties of Defense in Space 
 
The categories of direct, offensive threats to 
satellites have been very well understood for 
at least four decades.   These divide, generally 
speaking, into physical threats – impact 
(kinetic kill) or proximity explosion – and 
electro-magnetic threats, EMP, laser, high 
power microwaves, neutron beam.   Both 
types of attack can in theory be delivered by 
either terrestrially-based or space-based 
weapons.  The options for defense of satellites 
have also been understood: hardening, 
maneuver and various guardian or self-defense 
satellite schemes.  Given limitations on mass, 
satellites designers are faced with trade-offs 
between capability, service life, and defense.   
Generally speaking, they have made the 
choice of maximizing capability.   This is true 
of the large satellites that form the backbone 
of U.S. strategic space and of the next 
generation of satellites, including GPS- III. 23 
 
Given the state of satellite technology when 
these design decisions were made, they appear 
in retrospect to have been made with good 
reason.  Capability was maximized.   The 
operating environment remained relatively 
benign, at least as regards hostile attack.  
Even if designers had assumed a more hostile 
environment, it is not certain they would have 
altered fundamentally the tradeoff between 
capability and defense.  Some space 
                                                
23 It may be that the cost and development time of 
prospective space systems has raised fundamental 
questions about the comparative advantage of space, 
even for core functions like communications.   For 
example, General Cartwright told the Space Power 
Caucus in July 2008 that, given the cost of TSAT, 
perhaps DoD should “invest in airborne comm first” 
(Reported in the CAG’s “Legislative Update,” July 
2008).  
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capabilities, especially reconnaissance and 
communication, required large structures in 
fixed orbits which are inherently easier to 
target and therefore more difficult to defend. 
Some defensive measures repay their cost, but 
with diminishing returns.    For example, a 
satellite can be hardened against EMP and 
equipped to counter laser dazzling.  It can be 
given some maneuver capability.   But it 
cannot be hardened to defend against KE 
attack; maneuver is limited by on board fuel 
supplies (which are also needed for station 
keeping and against the contingency of 
maneuver to avoid space debris).  Finally, 
defense against jamming and laser attack may 
require, in effect, shutting down operations 
temporarily – which is all a potential 
adversary may require.  
 
Other measures such as equipping satellites 
with on board homing missiles against KE 
attack, or providing them with the capability 
of moving into parking orbits out of ASAT 
range, have been considered but not pursued, 
presumably because of prohibitive costs and 
technical obstacles.  In theory it is also 
conceivable that large satellites might be 
provided with small guardian satellites 
designed to intercept KE attack.   That 
technology does not currently exist.   
Moreover, KE attacks are only one – and 
arguably not the most likely – method an 
adversary might use, especially if the goal is 
to disable rather than to destroy a satellite.    
 
Stealth would be an ideal alternative for 
maintaining the benefits of large strategic 
satellites.   It would also be ideal to strengthen 
deterrence by greatly complicating an 
adversary’s attack options.   Discussions of 
such programs or capabilities are generally not 
part of the public discourse.  
 
Another approach for dealing with the 
inherent difficulties of satellite defense is 
“operationally responsive space” (ORS).   
Like other space strategic concepts, ORS has 
taken on several meanings.   The one most 
discussed, however, is the Air Force proposal 
to launch on short (30-day) notice satellites to 
replace those destroyed by hostile action.    
The advent of entrepreneurial companies 
promising “cheap launch” has given some 
impetus to this idea.   But cheap launch has 
not been demonstrated, and even if it could be, 
an ORS program would likely require 
considerable investment.  Moreover, a prudent 
attacker preempting against U.S. satellites 
would enhance chances of success by 
retaining second and third strike capability 
with far less expenditure of resources than we 
would require to replace the assets he 
destroys.   Although the U.S. would retain the 
option of attacking the ground installations 
supporting this second or third wave, counter 
measures – viz. launcher mobility – are well 
within the capability of major space-faring 
nations.   Ground-based laser or pulse 
weapons could be dispersed and disguised, or 
based in unwitting third countries.   The 
satellites replacing those destroyed would 
presumably be lighter, deployed in LEO 
where they would be less resistant to attack 
and only available after some delay. That 
might be a conceivable option in the era of 
large and protracted conventional war (if the 
problem of survivability of the satellites could 
be resolved).  But technology has made 
sudden attacks to gain territory or for tactical 
advantage more likely, and against this sort of 
attack, a month-long loss of initiative could 
well be fatal.  
 
Finally, the notion of operationally responsive 
space is another example of how 
nomenclature can bias analysis.   What U.S. 
commanders are interested in is not 
“operational responsiveness space” but 
operational responsiveness itself, however 
achieved.   Space may very well not be the 
most cost effective way of achieving that goal.  
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The next generation of GPS satellites will 
begin deploying in 2014.   Both GPS and 
other systems currently in production are 
expected to have a service life of several 
decades, which means that U.S. strategic 
defenses will depend on large, single point of 
failure systems at least until 2040, and 
potentially well beyond.   These systems 
cannot be retrofitted in orbit to increase their 
self-defense capabilities – even if practical 
measures were available to do so.   Moreover, 
the cost of completing programs already 
approved as centerpieces of U.S. strategic 
space are such as to make the simultaneous 
development of alternative technologies 
problematic, at least without devoting 
considerable, additional resources to military 
space.  There are circumstances in which this 
sort of budget commitment might be made; 
but that is hardly a desirable alternative from 
the point of view of the United States.   Once 
the next generation of systems is on line, U.S. 
ground, sea and air forces will become even 
more dependent on space assets, and therefore 
more vulnerable to interruption of the 
information they provide. 
 
Meanwhile, advances in technology may offer 
an inherently more defensible means of 
deploying capability in space.  Many argue 
that mini-satellites hold the promise of basing 
mode which is much more difficult for a 
possible adversary to target.24  Constellations 
of these satellites might provide some or even 
most of the same functions of the existing 
satellite constellation.  They could be designed 
to degrade incrementally, in essence 
reconfiguring to account for losses of some of 
their element to hostile action.  Finally (and 
again, in theory), mini-satellites would be 
cheaper to develop than existing, large multi-
                                                
24 Will Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space 
Assets:  A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation 
Architecture,” Astropolitics, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2008, 
pp. 154-199. 
function satellites.  More redundancy would 
therefore be possible within existing budgets.   
All these characteristics of mini-satellite 
constellations would enhance deterrence.  
Indeed, adoption of this technology by all 
major space-faring nations might create the 
defense dominant atmosphere in space which 
is not only favorable for deterrence but for a 
stable and predictable space environment.  
 
There are, however, reasons for skepticism, 
not least that no one has so far succeeded in 
deploying constellations of mini-satellites.    
To quote a noted strategic analyst, “It’s 
possible to attribute any qualities you want to 
a system you have yet to develop.”25  Thus, 
constellations of mini-satellites are said to 
have the potential of replacing not only 
command and control and electronic 
surveillance functions, but even 
reconnaissance missions that now require 
large structures to accommodate very long 
focal point cameras. It is also possible to 
conceive of mini-satellites employed as co-
orbiting hunter killers.  None of these visions 
has been proven.  
 
Perhaps the most formidable obstacles, 
however, are political and cultural.   It is 
difficult to imagine the national leadership 
adopting a strategy of relying on unproven 
technology for key strategic capabilities, 
especially given the sunk costs already 
devoted to the next generation of satellites.  
Even if this decision were made by the new 
administration, the existing (and more 
vulnerable) satellite infrastructure would 
continue to provide the foundation of U.S. 
space capability for many years to come.  As 
well, the advent of mini-satellites will tend to 
level the playing field, and de-value the U.S. 
industrial base.  That industrial base is built to 
                                                
25 Walt Slocum, referring to the potential CEP of the 
MX missile warheads to the author at a time (1983) 
when the MX had not yet been tested. 
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create large, complex, very capable satellites.  
No one can match us in that capability.   But it 
is of less comparative value in an era of mini-
satellites, which – as a consequence – have 
little attraction for our large, aerospace 
companies.   It is no coincidence that the locus 
of mini-satellite development has in the 
universities, or that the trend toward cheap, 
low technology launchers has been led by 
startups in the private sector. 
 
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) has been offered 
as an option to strengthen deterrence by 
convincing adversaries that the United States 
is capable of destroying threatening capability 
anywhere in the world by means (e.g. 
conventionally armed SLBMs) against which 
there is no defense.  This option might be 
thought of as active or preemptive defense, 
and could be useful as deterrent against an 
enemy’s direct assent KE weapons, or against 
a second or third wave attack by any other 
fixed, surface-based systems.   
 
There are objections to PGS, at least in theory.   
For example, PGS assumes availability of 
exact and extremely reliable intelligence of 
the quality that has been notably absent in 
recent conflicts.   It employs a delivery means 
that, once launched, cannot be recalled – even 
if the intelligence changes or the adversary 
wishes to capitulate.  Our resort to 
conventionally armed SLBMs as a tool of 
military conflict could and probably would be 
matched by the Russian Federation, and 
potentially by the PRC as well.  A target of 
sufficient value to justify launch of a nuclear-
capable intercontinental ballistic missile (even 
if conventionally armed) would presumably be 
of such urgency that destruction would have to 
be assured, requiring launch of more than one 
missile, and perhaps a volley.  Finally, our 
obligations under the START treaty would 
require us to notify the Russians before an 
SLBM launch; they have no reciprocal treaty 
obligation to keep that information 
confidential.  Such an interchange might 
destabilize the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear 
relationship that remains the most important 
single factor in U.S. national security.  
Nevertheless, the existence of PGS as 
demonstrated capability would have a 
deterrent effect on potential adversaries, or at 
least those few who themselves possessed no 
practical means to retaliate. 
 
We conclude that defense, like the 
vulnerability gap, will continue to present 
challenges for a policy of space deterrence.  
All practical should be done to bolster the 
defense of satellites.  But the vulnerability of 
key space assets will not be overcome within 
our twenty-year timeframe. 
 
Attribution of Attack 
 
An abiding issue for space deterrence is the 
difficulty in attributing attack, and 
distinguishing between intentional 
interference and the consequences of 
operating in an electro-magnetically active 
and physically harsh environment.  If a 
satellite ceases to operate, or operate 
effectively, the fact will be immediately 
apparent, but the cause may remain unknown. 
The problem of attribution is not entirely 
unique to space; it exists as well in other 
theaters of military operation, particularly the 
War on Terror and cyber warfare.  The 
contestants in the Cold War often used 
surrogates and “spoofing” to disguise the real 
origins of conventional attacks.  Still, 
attribution in space poses particular problems. 
 
 In general, we will only become aware of an 
attack in space because of its effects.  Direct 
ascent KE weapons, such as the one tested by 
the PRC in 2007, are an exception to this rule; 
the origin of the attack of such weapons would 
be detected.   But for a variety of other attacks 
– either from space based interceptors or, 
more likely, ground based dazzling or 
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jamming – origin may be difficult to 
determine, and the identity of the attacker 
even more so.  For example, a hostile entity 
might mount a jamming or dazzling attack 
from a third country, as the Iranians 
apparently did from Cuba in 2003.  The 
culprits in that case were eventually 
determined, but only after a lapse of some 
months.  It is conceivable, though not likely, 
that a similar operation could be conducted 
from neutral countries or even countries allied 
with the United States without the knowledge 
of the government.  It is also possible that we 
might attribute the failure of a space system in 
a crisis to the action of an adversary, when in 
fact, it results from the natural effects of the 
space environment itself, such as severe space 
weather.26 
 
The most difficult scenario arises if a key 
satellite simply ceases to function.  In that 
case, we may not know – or be able to 
discover – the cause of the malfunction.   
 
These difficulties, however, may be more 
apparent than real.  The likelihood of a 
random attack unconnected to some strategic 
or tactical purpose within the atmosphere is 
remote.  The greater  likelihood is that attacks 
will take place in the context of the failure of 
deterrence within the atmosphere, and 
therefore as a result of, or in preparation for, 
terrestrial hostilities.  In context, the source of 
the attack will be difficult for an adversary to 
disguise. Moreover, the redundancy in crucial 
satellite systems like MILSTAR and GPS 
means that gaining military advantage would 
necessarily involve a coordinated attack on a 
number of satellites; an adversary could 
hardly expect such an attack to be mistaken 
for anything else, or the origin of the attack to 
remain long secret.  The number of countries 
                                                
26“Severe Space Weather,” Science@NASA, 21 January 
2009, p. 1. http://science.nasa.gov/ headlines/y2009/ 
21jan_severespaceweather.htm?list209021  
that might be expected to have both motive 
and capability to launch such an attack is 
small, and not likely to grow appreciably in 
the twenty-year timeframe of this study.   
Finally, experience in the Cold War and the 
war on terror indicates that we will often 
discover the origin of attack not from 
detecting the attacker at the time, nor from 
direct evidence available at the point of attack, 
but from intelligence sources with access to 
the information either directly from the 
attacking country or through third parties – 
not, that is, exclusively from ELINT, but also 
from HUMINT sources.   Such detection 
might even occur before the fact. 
 
The question from the point of view of 
deterrence theory is: will a potential adversary 
believe that the origin of his attack on U.S. 
space assets can be disguised?   Will he make 
the key decision based on this assumption?   If 
so, deterrence is weakened.   But – for the 
reasons listed above – a prudent adversary 
would have to assume that the origin of such 
an attack could not be disguised, especially if 
the attack were connected with hostilities on 
the surface or took place in the context of 
tensions between the attacker and the U.S.  He 
would have to have a plan not just for the 
initial attack, but for a strategy if the origin of 
the attack were discovered; and if that plan 
were not credible, deterrence would be 
strengthened.   In short, he would have to act 
as if the attack would be discovered.  His 
assessment would be affected by his 
perception of U.S. SSA capabilities, as well as 
by his assessment of the competence of U.S. 
intelligence.  He might underestimate our 
actual capability.   But just as there is no 
substitute in deterrence theory for the 
perception that our leadership is competent, so 
there is no substitute for a reputation for 
competent, all pervasive and all-seeing U.S. 
intelligence capability. 
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We recognize that these same considerations 
may not apply to harassing, transitory 
jamming or dazzling interference, exemplified 
by the Iran attempt to disrupt a U.S. satellite 
from a source in Cuba.   On the contrary, more 
of these are likely.   If the concern is a 
disabling attack on significant U.S. space 
capability, however, we believe an adversary 
would have to judge the likelihood of 
attribution as high, and the affect of disguise 
as an effective tactic correspondingly low.  
 
In short, there is no evidence available in open 
sources pointing to the conclusion that an 
adversary could destroy a significant portion 
of the U.S. strategic space capability by 
clandestine means; although incidental 
attempts to degrade U.S. assets might be 
difficult to distinguish from intentional 
interference in individual cases, no systematic 
attack could be disguised or would likely be 
mistaken for anything else. Nor could an 
attacker reasonably expect to remain 
undetected. It is also possible a natural 
occurrence like severe space weather might be 
interpreted in time of crisis as a hostile attack.  
A bolt from the blue attack, launched with 
weapons developed and deployed in secret 
and unrelated to a terrestrial conflict may be 
conceivable, but is not a practical possibility 
in our judgment.  Improvements in SSA are 
crucial to the certainty of attribution, as are an 
improved ability to recognize anomalies in our 
space constellation and to use that knowledge 
to alert satellite operators and national security 
decision makers.  That aspect of the 
attribution issue is dealt with below. 
 
Resolve, Red Lines, Trigger Events, 
and Deterrence Guarantees 
 
Will an opponent perceive that national 
leaders lack the resolve to retaliate for an 
attack in space that is invisible to public 
opinion and perhaps leaves essential civilian 
services intact?   It is a notable feature of our 
political system that those out of power tend 
to doubt that those in power have sufficient 
resolve, especially if they belong to a different 
party.   Military leaders can have these same 
doubts about their civilian superiors, and – in 
some cases – civilians about the military.  In 
our country, these doubts are very public and 
will be known to a potential adversary, who 
may therefore judge retaliation unlikely - not 
for lack of capability, but for lack of will. 
 
Doubts have consequences for policy.  
Perception of lack of resolve – or the fear that 
others may perceive such a deficiency – is one 
motivation, for example, behind a policy of 
“red lines” or “trigger events”, i.e., 
declarations that certain, specified acts by an 
opponent which will automatically trigger 
U.S. response.27   These policies have two 
goals, one domestic and one international.  On 
the domestic side they are intended to build 
bureaucratic consensus by reassuring doubters 
that under certain circumstances, retaliation is 
automatic.   Internationally, they are meant to 
persuade potential adversaries that they cannot 
exploit internal weaknesses within the U.S. 
political or national strategic communities to 
gain advantage, particularly by incremental 
attacks.  
 
There are a number of objections to red lines.  
To have any significance they must be drawn 
around some things but exclude others.  
Secretary of State Acheson unintentionally 
sent a message to both the North Korean and 
Chinese leadership in 1950 by defining our 
                                                
27 This aspect of trigger events is parodied in the movie 
“Dr. Strangelove” by the “doomsday device,” rigged to 
destroy the world automatically if the Soviet Union is 
under nuclear attack.  The strength of the doomsday 
device as a deterrent is that it removes all doubts about 
“resolve” by taking man (in the fictional case, the 
Soviet First Secretary, who might decide not to 
retaliate) out of the loop.    This example also points up 
the importance of making red lines or trigger events 
public if they are to have value as deterrents. 
Space and Defense, Summer 2009                                                                        17 
 
“sphere of interest” in Asia to exclude the 
Koreas.  Red lines” may also be less red than 
they seem, i.e., the fact that leaders feel 
impelled to proclaim red lines may be taken as 
a sign of ambiguity rather than resolve.  In the 
Cold War, red lines tended to proliferate 
precisely in those areas where retaliation 
might otherwise be thought uncertain – both 
by our adversaries, and to some degree, by 
ourselves.   There was no need in those years 
to proclaim red lines around the sovereign 
territory of the United States, for example.   In 
Europe and Asia, on the other hand, they 
tended to proliferate. 
 
Another objection to “red lines” as external 
trigger events is that they tend to be seen (and 
used) as limits on the flexibility of the 
commander in chief, i.e., as ways to bolster a 
potentially wavering national command 
authority during times of crisis.   But effective 
national security leaders will insist on 
flexibility in those circumstances whatever 
trigger events have been announced or red 
lines drawn in advance. Kennedy’s drawing 
and then redrawing of “red lines” to give 
Soviet leaders a chance to reconsider in the 
Cuban missile crisis is perhaps the best case in 
point.  
 
In space, red lines may take the form – among 
others - of deterrence guarantees for the 
commercial constellation.   The question 
arises because of the increased use of the 
commercial network for military 
communication.   All the objections to red 
lines apply equally to this question, with the 
added problem of credibility, since many 
commercial satellites are owned either by 
international conglomerates or by countries 
that will probably be neutral in any future 
space conflict.   Would the U.S. risk escalation 
in a space conflict to retaliate for attacks on 
non-sovereign assets?  Would it wish to 
forego the option of itself retaliating against 
commercial satellites used by adversary 
nations for military communication?  Would 
the red line of “deterrence guarantee” extend 
to some of the constellation, or to all – and if 
to all, how credible could it be?   
 
There may be some limited role in crisis for 
the use of declaratory policy like red lines.  
For example, the U.S. effectively extended a 
deterrence guarantee to third country tankers 
in the Persian Gulf during the crisis there in 
1987.   Those tankers were temporarily 
“flagged,” and declared to be U.S. sovereign 
assets.   Such a temporary tactic may also be 
useful in space; at least it should not be ruled 
out.    
 
In sum, red lines and trigger events as 
elements of doctrine are not a solution to the 
problem of perceived strategic resolve, and 
may have several negative consequences.   
They are therefore of limited use.  But the 
problem of “resolve” (insofar as it exists 
except as a tool of political debate) is not one 
that can be solved by doctrine, bureaucratic 
organization or declarations.  If a possible 
adversary perceives lack of resolve, deterrence 
is weakened.  But the solution is to elect 
competent leaders, who will not project 
indecision in crises, an issue that is well 
outside the confines of this study. 
 
Section IV:  Responding to the 
Challenges of Space Deterrence 
 
Four Layers of Space Deterrence 
 
Given the unique nature of the space 
environment and the fundamental differences 
between space systems and nuclear weapons, 
we conclude that a layered approach to 
deterrence is most appropriate in this context.  
Just as the uniqueness of the space 
environment poses four distinct challenges for 
a strategy of space deterrence (see page 10 
above), so we believe that effective space 
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deterrence requires a “layered” approach with 
four essential elements: 
 
• International norms 
• Entanglement 
• Retaliation 
• Denial 
 
Deterrence by International Norms 
 
International norms are understood here to 
include all treaty and customary law as well as 
arms control treaties, test bans, formal and 
informal weapons moratoria, confidence 
building measures and “rules of the road”.  
The question is whether these mechanisms - 
either singly or in combination - have 
deterrent effect, and whether they are 
legitimately (and even necessary) elements of 
a U.S. deterrence policy.  
 
No international agreement is likely to deter a 
determined attacker in space any more than on 
the surface.   Arms control agreements that 
have curtailed possible aggressive actions in 
space – notably the provisions of the strategic 
and intermediate range nuclear arms limitation 
agreement, which ban interference with 
national technical means (NTM) – have 
incorporated rather than created a mutually 
acceptable status quo.   Finally, it may be the 
case that agreements regulating the behavior 
of nations in space have only been effective 
insofar as any one of those nations have 
lacked the capability and/or interest in 
violating them.   The same could be said, of 
course, of any political agreement between 
sovereign entities. 
 
The history of multilateral accords specifically 
regarding space is one of successive 
international agreements, albeit of diminishing 
scope.28  The Outer Space Treaty is the most 
                                                
28 The Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue and 
Return Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention 
 
sweeping; among other things, it bans the 
stationing of nuclear (but not conventional) 
weapons in orbit and military activity on the 
lunar surface, stating that the moon and other 
celestial bodies must be used for “peaceful 
purposes.”  In agreeing to these limitations, 
U.S. policy makers decided nuclear weapons 
had limited utility in space, and that 
verification was therefore not essential.   The 
other provisions of the treaty were similarly 
unverifiable, but there is no evidence that any 
have been violated, or that nuclear weapons 
have been deployed (or are likely to be 
deployed) outside the atmosphere.   
 
Meanwhile, states were organizing 
internationally under the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to allocate 
bandwidth for communication satellites, and 
the United States undertook its own 
regulations in that regard administered by the 
FCC. 
  
The latest U.S. policy document (2006) tacitly 
accepts the benefits of existing legal regimes 
in space, while asserting that no additional 
regulations are necessary.   It asserts a U.S. 
right to freedom of action in space, 
presumably unhindered even by existing 
international agreement (a shift from the 
Clinton space policy of 1996).  Arguably, this 
right is no more than all sovereign nations 
insist on; but its assertion was generally 
greeted with accusations of U.S. unilateralism 
and aspirations to “space control.” Regarding 
                                                
 
(1972) and the Registration Convention (1975).  Space 
activities are also affected by provisions of the 1963 
Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibits nuclear 
explosion in outer space, the 1980 Environmental 
Modification Convention which prohibits techniques 
which produce “long-lasting, severe or widespread 
environmental changes in Earth’s atmosphere or in 
outer space” is also binding on the Russian Federation 
prohibiting interference with national technical means 
of verification.  See Waldrop, Ibid. p. 13. 
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arms control, whereas the space policy of the 
Clinton Administration had left open the 
possibility of arms control agreements that 
were “equitable, effectively verifiable, and 
enhanced the security of the United States and 
its allies,” the Bush Administration policy 
emphasized the negative, ruling out any new 
legal regimes or “other restrictions.”  It did 
not, on the other hand, explicitly rule out arms 
control, as long as such regimes did not impair 
the rights of the U.S. to conduct research, 
development, testing, and operations or other 
activities in space.29    
 
Formal agreements affecting interference with 
satellites have been effective – indeed, more 
effective in the case of “national technical 
means” than strictly required by the language 
of the treaties that mention them.  Both the 
Russians and the United States have extended 
the “non-interference” ban to the entire 
military space constellation of the other.  This 
is certainly in part because neither side wished 
to designate which of its satellites was 
involved in the functions covered under the 
NTM provisions; but it has undeniably 
brought a level of stability and predictability 
to the strategic balance between the U.S. and 
Russians in space. 
      
Verifiable testing bans can also be effective, 
as the Partial Test Ban Treaty has shown.  An 
adversary is unlikely to launch a preemptive 
attack with weapons he has never tested under 
realistic conditions.   Such tests in space – 
                                                
29 The Bush space policy document reportedly went 
through thirty-four drafts, a good indicator of a 
brokered result.  That would account for language 
which, on the one hand, does not explicitly rule out 
arms control (thus satisfying some bureaucratic 
interests), but on the other hand makes arms control 
practically impossible (thus satisfying others).   It 
would also account for the inconsistency of insisting on 
a sovereign right to freedom of action, while also 
asserting a right to deny such freedom to other 
sovereign nations. 
particularly of KE vehicles – would be seen.  
There are those who argue that a single test 
might be disguised and would be sufficient.  
That is not likely, in our view.  Since the U.S. 
has renounced the option of KE ASAT 
weapons, and given the growth in 
international concern about space debris in 
recent months, a ban on KE ASAT test may 
be a very productive approach by the United 
States to future arms control in space. 
 
Informal international norms can also be 
effective.   For example, the PRC reportedly 
followed its KE test with informal assurances 
in Europe and the United States that the test 
would not be repeated.   Reports have 
meanwhile leaked to the press of two previous 
PRC tests of the same system that had failed.   
The U.S. apparently had observed those 
failure as well as preparations for the eventual 
successful test.  The U.S. did not intervene 
diplomatically to stop any of the tests; it did 
not publicly protest the successful test, 
although several other countries did, and the 
U.S. made representations only about the 
resulting debris field.   In this case, the U.S. 
was abiding by its own strictures about 
freedom of action in space.  To have protested 
the Chinese attack would have been to 
acknowledge the existence of some informal 
norm of behavior which bound all space-
faring nations, something which the United 
States has specifically denied.  Still, the 
political result of the Chinese test tended to 
confirm the existence of such informal norms 
sufficient to persuade the Chinese not to 
pursue this sort of testing.  The U.S., too, must 
react to such informal norms, one reason 
perhaps that the Bush Administration, 
probably more receptive than its predecessors 
to the notion of stationing weapons in space, 
did not pursue that option.  Indeed, the 2006 
space policy document, although characterized 
by some on the Left as more aggressive than 
its Clinton Administration predecessor, was 
arguably in some ways more cautious.  
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Finally, arms control negotiations can 
facilitate communication and provide 
information about what is really of value to an 
opponent.  For example, we learned in the 
process of strategic arms negotiations with the 
Soviet Union that we had overestimated the 
value they attached to large, MIRV’d ICBMs, 
and underestimated the value they ascribed to 
preventing the U.S. from deploying an 
effective anti-ballistic missile system.   That 
knowledge informed the U.S. approach to 
both strategic policy and arms control over the 
following two decades.   
 
In short, arms control and other international 
norms can be an aid to deterrence, and can 
help in discerning a potential adversary’s 
intent and the relative value he ascribes to his 
space and other strategic assets.30  Arms 
control agreements which verifiably limit 
testing can strengthen deterrence by 
decreasing an adversary’s confidence in his 
chances of success, enhance warning of a 
change in the strategic environment, and help 
dampen an arms race in areas otherwise of no 
interest to the United States (such as KE 
vehicles).   Verification of agreements in 
space remains an obstacle.  As far as we can 
determine from open sources, for at least the 
last decade the government has not sponsored 
active efforts to determine how technological 
advances might be leveraged to enhance 
verification of space arms control agreements. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 General Kehler, speaking at the 2008 National Space 
Symposium, acknowledged the potential benefit of such 
an approach when he stated that “a diplomatic mission 
to sway a would-be space attacker could outweigh the 
use of offensive counterspace options,” Inside the Air 
Force, April 2008.  The history of cooperative 
measures in the Cold War has been analyzed in greater 
detail by Jervis (1976), Axelrod (1984), and Moltz 
(2008). 
Deterrence by Entanglement 
 
Deterrence by entanglement is the notion that 
state actors will be deterred from attacking 
others because of economic interdependence.   
The notion has a checkered history.  Norman 
Angell speculated in 1913 that 
interdependence of trade in Europe made 
another European War impractical.31 In fact, 
two wars followed in the next four decades. 
  
Still, the degree of globalized interdependence 
that characterizes the modern world is without 
precedent.  It is also different in kind.   In the 
first decades of the 18th Century, 
interdependence was based on trade in 
tangible goods, and governments still 
controlled both trade and investment flows.   
Governments could decide to forego certain 
economic advantages, including those arising 
from trade, in the service of national 
ambitions.   In our new millennium, wealth 
has increasingly lost its relationship to 
tangible goods, and governments no longer 
control the flow of foreign investment, which 
can now occur instantly because of the 
independent decisions of multiple 
international actors who have concern only for 
maximizing profits and minimizing losses.   
Seven trillion dollars of “wealth” was 
destroyed in the United States in a period of 
two weeks in September/October of 2008 – 
and many trillions more in the rest of the 
world – without a shot being fired or, indeed, 
any tangible wealth being affected in any way.   
Governments might have wished to deter 
investors from the decisions that led to this 
widespread and virtual destruction of wealth, 
but lacked the means to do so.  They were at 
the mercy of something that can be 
summarized by the phrase “investor 
confidence.” 
 
                                                
31 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, New York and 
London, 1913. 
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Judgments of the market now extend to all 
globalized economies, regardless of ideology 
or political system; the only defense is to take 
an economy “off the grid” – a solution 
employed by the regime in Burma, for 
example, but no longer available to leaders in 
the United States, China, India or – indeed – 
any other country which might be considered 
a future adversary of the United States in 
space.   This new international economic 
interdependence is perhaps best exemplified 
by the relationship of the U.S. and the PRC 
which has led to a U.S. trade deficit created by 
purchase of PRC consumer goods financed by 
PRC purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds.32  
Deterrence by entanglement, therefore, is not 
only now a function of interdependence, as it 
was thought to be a century ago.  Although we 
are “entangled” economically with the 
Chinese, perhaps even to the point of deterring 
hostile Chinese acts against U.S. interests in 
their geographic sphere of influence, both 
China and the United States are entangled in 
an international financial system which neither 
country can control, and the judgments of 
which are final.  
 
Satellites, of course, are one communication 
node in that financial system.  Any 
generalized breakdown in that system which 
could not easily be repaired – for example, the 
destruction of all satellite communication by 
nuclear detonations in space – would threaten 
“wealth” on a massive scale.   It might be 
argued that repercussions would be less severe 
on China than the United States, because 
much of the Chinese economy is not 
globalized.   The argument is not persuasive.   
The impact of a generalized destruction of 
space assets would have a considerable impact 
on Chinese business and political elites, i.e. 
those whose decisions matter.  The impact on 
growth areas of the Chinese economy would 
                                                
32 James Fallows, “The $1.4 Trillion Question,” The 
Atlantic, January/February 2008. 
be particularly serious.  Reconstruction of the 
financial system without space assets – or with 
sufficient terrestrial backup to restore 
confidence in reliable financial transactions – 
would be a formidable and time-consuming 
task.  Even an attack on a significant 
proportion of the commercial satellite 
infrastructure would have huge consequences 
for the wealth of globalized economies.   It is 
difficult to envision the sort of gain in foreign 
or security policy terms that would offset this 
potential economic loss. 
  
Entanglement extends beyond financial 
transactions to all the various applications of 
GPS satellite data.  The U.S. ended encoding 
of GPS data in 2000.  Since then, our most 
precise GPS signal has been available 
globally.  That signal is now built into electric 
and transportation grids worldwide - among a 
vast number of other systems and devices, 
creating a degree of technological 
entanglement (and potential economic loss) 
that could only be truly appreciated if the GPS 
signal were suddenly to disappear.33   
 
The example of GPS demonstrates 
entanglement when civilian applications of a 
system originally built for a military purpose 
proliferate globally.  In such cases, the effects 
of any attempts to deny the original military 
function would not be confined to one country 
in a crisis, but would unavoidably draw in 
other states who have become reliant upon 
space over time.  The reverse situation also 
obtains.  Communications systems originally 
built for civilian, commercial purposes now 
carry a variety of necessary military traffic, 
including data from unmanned air systems 
                                                
33 The degree of interdependence on the GPS signal by 
2001 is described, inter alia, in The Rumsfeld Report.  
See “Report of the Commission to Assess United States 
National Security Space Management and Organization 
Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, p. 23. 
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such as the Predator.34  Hostile action to 
disrupt military communications over 
commercial systems would likely draw into 
the crisis numerous other governments whose 
own military or civilian traffic is carried by 
the same satellite as one of the warring 
factions.  Because the use of civilian 
commercial transponders is market-based and 
constantly shifting, an aggressor’s planning 
would be complicated by the inability 
effectively to predict which other friendly, 
neutral, or potentially adversarial states would 
be affected at any given moment by 
interference with a particular commercial 
satellite.35  The prospect of an expanding 
global market for satellite services means the 
unintended economic consequences of any 
attack on commercial – and even some key 
military satellites – will likely expand over 
time.  This entangling web of mutual 
dependence and shared consequence will act 
as a deterrent on the policy makers of all 
globalized economies. 
 
We are entangled with others in space 
physically as well as an economically, a fact 
highlighted by the recent conjunction of a 
Iridium and Cosmos satellite over Siberia 
which created a still expanding cloud of space 
debris.  Other near misses in both LEO and 
GEO during the first months of 2009 further 
underlined the space debris issue, which was 
one of the reasons the U.S. backed away from 
KE counter satellite technology – and why the 
Chinese KE test of January 2007 was viewed 
with such alarm.   No one knows how frequent 
                                                
34 Don Branum, “Coalition Force Reaper Unit Deploys 
to Joint Base Balad,” Air Force Print News Today, 21 
November 2008, 
www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=12312565. 
35 Then Colonel, now Lieutenant General Frank Klotz 
wrote in 1999 “The health and safety of some civilian 
satellites may become just as important to the outcome 
of an armed conflict as those of dedicated military 
satellites.”  See Space Commerce, and National 
Security, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, p. 10. 
conjunctions will be in the future.  That will 
depend, in part, on improvements in space 
situational awareness and in the systems by 
which information is shared between 
operators.  All agree that each conjunction 
increases the chances of more, and the 
eventual possibility of a cascade of 
conjunctions that will make low earth orbit - 
and the more popular orbits in GEO - more 
dangerous, increasing the costs of operating 
there and bringing further into question the 
comparative advantage space offers 
commercial operators.  Any large ASAT 
exchange in space would scatter debris 
precisely in those orbits most useful for ISR 
and communication of the combatants, and 
would raise the danger of making space 
unavailable for military and commercial users 
alike for as long as the resulting debris 
remained in orbit.   
 
As noted above, however, sovereign 
governments have the power, at least in the 
short term, to ignore or sacrifice their 
economic interests – and those of succeeding 
generations - to immediate strategic gains.  
Deterrence by entanglement is therefore one, 
but certainly not the only, component of a 
deterrence strategy. 
 
Deterrence by Retaliation 
 
Perhaps the most disputed question and the 
most intractable dilemma of space deterrence 
is whether it requires a space-for-space 
retaliatory option to be credible.   In other 
words, will an adversary believe that it can 
attack vital U.S. space assets with impunity if 
the U.S. lacks the option of retaliating in 
space?   
 
The analogue from Cold War deterrence 
theory is the notion of escalation dominance.  
The theory held that deterrence could best be 
maintained if the Soviets perceived that the 
U.S. was superior at every stage of potential 
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escalation: thus, the U.S. could counter 
conventional aggression on allies with 
conventional force, theater nuclear with 
theater nuclear force, strategic attack with 
strategic forces.   Seeing 1) U.S. willingness to 
escalate, and 2) the impossibility of achieving 
advantage through escalation itself, the 
Soviets would decide that attack would 
achieve no permanent advantage.   But this 
depended on credible forces being deployed at 
each rung of the escalatory ladder. 
  
Is the same thing true in space?   The answer 
is partly political rather than theoretical. If a 
potential adversary deployed space-based 
ASATs, it can safely be assumed that the U.S. 
would have no political choice but to follow 
their lead.   Aside from the expense, the 
resulting arms race would not be in the 
interests of the United States as predominant 
and most vulnerable actor .36  A space arms 
race would also have negative consequences 
for the commercial space industry, which 
depends on a stable and predictable space 
environment to justify large investments that 
space commercial infrastructure requires.  But 
none of these arguments would likely prevail 
in a situation where a potential adversary 
threatened to achieve an asymmetric 
advantage.   As well, the existence of such 
weapons in orbit unmatched by American 
capability would have a chilling effect on U.S. 
policy makers, and might limit their choices in 
situations of crisis.  
 
Some would argue that this space arms race is 
already in progress, although confined for the 
moment to laboratories and “dual use” 
systems assumed to have some counter space 
capability.  A future race in space is inevitable 
                                                
36 The expense is literally unknowable.  Even the cost 
of existing programs is calculable only within wide 
orders of magnitude.  We can assume, however, that the 
cost of ASAT arms race in space would be very 
considerable indeed. 
from this point of view; the U.S. should 
assume that others are working on orbiting 
ASAT weapons and begin work itself rather 
than allowing an asymmetric threat to develop 
in space. 
 
On the other hand, no country currently 
deploys an ASAT system in space; the only 
system which might be so described – the 
Soviet co-orbiting KE ASAT system – has not 
been tested in twenty-five years.  Whether any 
future space-based ASAT systems are in 
development cannot be determined from 
unclassified sources.  That the U.S. would 
have failed to detect “dual use” or “sleeper” 
satellites in orbit is possible in theory; in 
practice it has not been a claim made by 
responsible military commanders who would 
seem to have little motive to keep secret the 
existence of such a threat.   In short, we 
conclude that there is a threshold that has not 
been crossed between our current strategic 
situation in space and events (some within our 
control and some not) that would trigger a 
space-based ASAT arms race.   Others may 
have evidence to prove that conclusion wrong.  
If so, it will be included in the responses to 
our study we intend to publish when 
comments on it become available.  
 
There is another potential technological space 
competition that is visible in the open 
literature and, in our judgment, will set the 
tone for the future, i.e., devices intended to 
incapacitate satellites temporarily by 
degrading, denying or disrupting their 
operations or their signals.37    Ground-based 
systems have a number of advantages in that 
role.   The barriers to entry – in both capital 
and technology - are lower.   The availability 
of energy is comparatively unlimited, unlike 
space based systems where on-board energy 
                                                
37 See also: Elizabeth S. Waldrop, “Weaponization of 
Outer Space: U.S. National Policy” in Annals of Air 
and Space Law,  Vol. XX1X, p. 10. 
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supplies are a limiting factor in capability.  
The effects produced by ground based 
interference may be decisive in conflict, but 
are transitory, do not create space debris, 
perhaps delay attribution, and provide (or so it 
may seem to an attacker) less of a trigger for 
retaliation.    Jamming and dazzling devices 
already exist; the United States cannot prevent 
their future evolution and proliferation.   The 
U.S. has its own program of “tactical denial” 
as a key element of space strategic policy.   It 
is prudent to assume that Russia, the PRC and 
potentially other space-faring nations have 
similar programs.  Accordingly, outcome of 
future hostilities on the surface between the 
United States and a technologically 
sophisticated space-faring opponent may be 
decided by which side is more able to negate 
the satellite assets of the other, and to preserve 
relatively more of its own capability.   This 
tactic is not without technological hurdles of 
its own.  For example, the problem of 
“frequency overlay” makes it difficult to jam 
the satellites of possible adversaries without 
also jamming the signals from allied satellites 
and potentially even one’s own.  Still, in this 
area, as in others, technological superiority 
will be important.    If adversaries are 
convinced that U.S. “fight through” 
disruptions in space while disrupting the space 
services of adversaries, deterrence will be 
enhanced. 
 
Some argue that robust space deterrence 
requires a deployed ASAT capability in space, 
so that attacks in space can be answered in 
kind.  Such a capability faces political and 
budgetary obstacles. Congress has been 
consistently cool to the idea on grounds of 
cost and the conviction that an offensive 
ASAT arms race in space would not be in U.S. 
interest.  Others do not face similar obstacles.  
 
There are, however, potential mitigating 
factors.   First, an adversary could not be 
certain that retaliation would be limited to 
space.  Although the threat of escalation is 
often portrayed as inhibiting rather than 
empowering U.S. decision makers, that threat 
would also have to be taken seriously by an 
adversary. U.S. declaratory policy has always 
emphasized that retaliation for attacks on vital 
assets will be of a magnitude and by means of 
our choosing.38   No rational adversary could 
rule out a disproportionate response or so-
called “horizontal escalation” (for example in 
the cyber domain), especially if his conclusion 
was the same as ours: that limiting ourselves 
to space-for-space retaliation would leave the 
U.S. at a disadvantage.   He would also have 
to take into account the possibility of a less 
than rational response to his action, perhaps 
leading to an even more rapid escalation. 
 
The Cold War analogy is brinksmanship, the 
willingness to escalate unpredictably when 
vital strategic interests are threatened. 
 
The second mitigating factor is that even in 
the absence of dedicated ASAT systems, a 
potential attacker is not likely to perceive the 
U.S. lacks capability to retaliate against the 
space assets of an adversary.  Many nations 
perceive existing U.S. ballistic missile defense 
systems as having a dual-use nature, including 
potential anti-satellite capability.  The U.S. 
reportedly has an active and acknowledged 
program of “negation” designed to deny an 
adversary the use of his space assets as force 
multipliers in the case of hostilities within the 
atmosphere.   We may safely assume that 
other nations are pursuing similar programs.  
In our judgment, the most likely scenario for 
future space conflict is a “war of negation,” 
i.e. an attempt by each side to preserve the 
product of its space assets while denying those 
space services to the opponent.   To win such 
a contest requires technological superiority, 
                                                
38 See Joshua M. Epstein, “Horizontal Escalation,” 
International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 1983/84,  
pp. 19-31. 
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which the U.S. should make every effort to 
maintain and which, in this area as in others, is 
a vital element in maintaining space 
deterrence. 
 
We conclude that the threat of retaliation can 
remain a credible element of our overall space 
deterrence.  The attribution of attack is not an 
insuperable obstacle, and that questions of 
resolve will ultimately depend on the 
perceptions of a potential attacker in the 
circumstances existing when his decision to 
attack is being considered.   A credible threat 
of retaliation may require willingness to 
escalate into other domains.  It could include 
fielding ASAT systems if such systems are 
deployed by others, but the resulting arms race 
would not be in the interests of the United 
States.  The U.S. should not be the first to 
deploy such systems and the U.S. use the full 
extent of its influence internationally to avoid 
that outcome.  Ultimately, a threat of 
retaliation is never more credible than the 
leader and the government that issues it.   No 
declaratory policy can compensate for an 
irresolute commander in chief, one who is 
misinformed or badly served by his 
subordinates.   An opponent will tend to judge 
the likelihood of retaliation not according to 
proclamations made months or years earlier, 
but according to the situation pertaining at the 
time – as Hitler did in Europe and Saddam did 
in the Middle East.  What a President does in 
the run up to and conduct of a crisis will have 
far more to do with an adversaries decisions 
than libraries full of ultimatums and 
guarantees.  Subordinates who doubt the 
resolution of a commander will try to limit his 
or her flexibility to respond other than in ways 
the subordinates think appropriate.  A wise 
commander in chief, on the other hand, will 
strive to maintain flexibility, to approach a 
particular conflict in the context of wider 
responsibilities, to take account of factors 
which were unforeseen when the doctrine or 
battle plan was devised – in short, to balance 
one risk off against others. No bureaucratic 
arrangement, declaratory doctrine or weapon 
capability will compensate when such 
leadership is not present. 
 
Deterrence by Denial 
 
Deterrence by denial is a policy which 
convinces an adversary undeterred by norms, 
economic costs, or the threat of retaliation that 
in the end he cannot achieve the purposes 
intended by launching an attack.  During the 
Cold War, the advent of long-range nuclear 
missiles and Soviet conventional superiority in 
Europe combined to make denial problematic 
as a centerpiece of doctrine.   A host of Cold 
War doctrines – flexible response, defense in 
depth, rapid reinforcement, assured second-
strike capability – were developed to make 
deterrence by denial more credible.   The 
advent of the “triad” of submarine launched 
ballistic missiles, hardened land-based ICBMs 
and strategic bombers on airborne alert could 
also be portrayed as elements of a denial 
strategy.   President Reagan’s SDI initiative in 
1983 brought deterrence by denial to the 
forefront in the nuclear standoff, at the same 
time moving the emphasis away from the 
balance of terror.   
 
The nub of the political debate in the United 
States in these years was whether these were 
steps to enhance deterrence or preparations for 
war fighting.   In fact, they were both by 
necessity.  No policy of deterrence by denial 
could be credible without the perception that 
the U.S. could absorb an initial attack 
(whether conventional or nuclear) and still 
fight and win the resulting war, delivering 
unacceptable damage to the enemy.   
 
Accordingly, no strategy of space deterrence 
by denial can be credible unless a potential 
adversary perceives that the U.S. military 
capability within the atmosphere will not be 
crippled by attacks in space, i.e. that the U.S. 
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will retain superior war fighting capability 
even after an initial attack.   If to this 
perception is added the conviction that his 
own space or other capability will also be 
degraded or destroyed in the process, 
deterrence is that much stronger. 
 
 
Section V:  Recommendations 
 
This study argues that deterrence in space 
cannot be oriented around a single concept or 
created by measures limited to space alone. 
Instead space deterrence must be considered as 
a series of successive layers, some of which 
involve space assets and some of which 
require better exploitation of existing assets in 
the atmosphere. Together, a layered deterrence 
framework will be more responsive to changes 
in the dynamic security environment and 
provide policy makers with a variety of 
choices in responding to hostile action. 
 
We believe a layered space deterrence 
framework can be created and strengthened by 
the following eight steps: 
 
1. Improve Space Situational Awareness 
 
Deterrence depends upon accurate 
information, especially in discriminating 
between intentional and unintentional/natural 
interference, in assessing the operation of 
rules of the road, in verification of any future 
arms control agreements, and in enhanced 
warning – all elements of an effective 
deterrence posture. Aside from its role in 
deterrence, improved SSA is necessary to 
allow more efficient use of orbital space, for 
space traffic management and for tracking and 
mitigation of space debris. The U.S. 
recognized the importance of SSA by 
assigning responsibility for this issue to 
Strategic Command in the Unified Command 
Plan. This will promote a joint approach to the 
issue, with the Air Force and sister services 
providing the capabilities required. 
 
Beyond this, however, the United States 
should: 
 
• Invest in better sensors, more satellites, and 
improved ground equipment, and 
communication/synergize existing data to 
create a more effective database and make 
better use of the information we have. 
• Undertake a thoroughgoing review of data 
in the public domain to determine the scope 
of information that can be exchanged with 
other spacefaring states without 
compromising security interests. 
• Reach agreements with commercial 
operators to upgrade future satellites to 
include SSA sensors, either integral to 
satellite design or as hosted payloads. 
• Seek agreement with coalition of allies and 
other spacefaring states on the scope of 
information exchange with commercial 
operators. 
• Establish a clearing house for exchange of 
SSA information in the form of a limited 
access “blog” or website on which both 
governments and private operators can post 
whatever information they choose; as 
confidence in such a system builds, better 
and more complete information will appear, 
inaccurate information can be 
identified/isolated, and a broader database 
will be created. 
• Encourage rather than discourage like-
minded spacefaring states to improve their 
SSA capabilities. 
 
2. Internal Red Lines – Space Alerts 
 
Internal red lines – thresholds of interference 
that activate system wide alert and trigger 
notification to the national command 
authority – are not just useful in themselves 
but an element of deterrence.  They would be 
equivalent in space to the DEFCON system 
which has proved effective both in its 
intended function – to increase the military 
alert level – and also as a diplomatic signal to 
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a potential attacker not only that forces are on 
alert, but that the attention of those within our 
government with the power to order 
retaliation is engaged.   This system would 
also force military space operators to create a 
system to identify a trigger level of 
anomalies/degradations that should be 
brought to the attention of the NCA whether 
or not the source of problem can be 
immediately identified.  Adversaries may try 
to spoof this system (as all such systems), but 
two can play that game. 
 
3. Defense 
 
Insofar as defense of satellites can be 
enhanced, both deterrence and security are 
strengthened. But the concept of defense 
should be extended to defending our 
capability, rather than just the satellites. 
Historically, defense of satellites – chiefly by 
hardening and maneuver – is expensive, 
compromises capability for a given mass, and 
quickly runs into diminishing returns. 
 
4. Deploy Space Assets in Inherently 
More Defensible Modes 
 
Vulnerability can be lessened – and deterrence 
enhanced – by moving to constellations of 
smallsats that are more difficult both to detect 
and to attack. Smallsat technology is evolving 
rapidly, although it is unproven as a substitute 
for key elements in our national security space 
constellation. In addition, there are some 
intelligence and reconnaissance functions 
smallsats may not be able to replace and – 
realistically – the existing space infrastructure 
will continue to rely on large, single point of 
failure systems at least through the 20-year 
timeframe of this study. Still, the U.S. cannot 
afford to lag in smallsat development, and 
they may be a near-term solution to 
maintaining essential space services in a 
hostile space environment. 
 
5. Operational Responsiveness in place of 
Operationally Responsive Space 
 
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the 
notion of “operationally responsive space” is 
impractical on the one hand, and too limiting 
as an operational concept on the other hand. A 
prudent attacker will retain capability against 
a second-wave or third-wave of space 
deployments. Even the most optimistic 
assumptions assume a gap of 30 days before 
some capability could be restored, which in 
modern war may be more than enough for an 
attacker to achieve decisive advantage. Our 
goal, on the contrary, should be to maintain 
operationally responsive services to the 
warfighter from a host of different sources, 
using existing technology within the 
atmosphere and on the surface. 
 
For example: 
 
• Exploit existing and new air breathing and 
lighter than air platforms, both manned and 
unmanned. The ability to surge air 
breathing and lighter than air platforms to 
restore capability lost from attacks on 
satellites is crucial to a policy of deterrence 
by denial and also to warfighting if 
deterrence fails. 
• Expanding capability of fiber optic and 
airborne communication within theater 
could provide an alternative to space at 
acceptable cost and using known 
technology. Existence of such an option 
would complicate attempts to compromise 
U.S. capability and force an attacker to 
compete successfully in yet another arena – 
thus, strengthening deterrence. 
 
 
 
 
6. Expand Military Use of the 
Commercial Constellation 
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The commercial constellation is a central 
factor in “deterrence by entanglement,” and 
also a means to complicate targeting options 
for any potential adversary. Military 
communication is already carried on 
commercial satellites and that usage expands 
in time of active hostilities. The U.S. cannot 
replace the space capabilities that the 
commercial sector provides (e.g., up to 80% 
of all communications bandwidth). The 
practice of buying transponder time on the 
spot market enhances deterrence with the 
space equivalent of multi-aim point basing. 
The U.S. should encourage the expansion of 
the commercial network by guaranteeing 
multi-year buys, in return for satellite 
operators agreeing to harden future satellites 
against EMP and other hazards, and equipping 
them to protect classified communication and 
with sensors to aid SSA. It may also be useful 
to overbuy transponder time, especially in 
times of crises. We do not recommend 
extending a general deterrence guarantee to 
the commercial sector. If the inherent 
deterrent of mutual dependence does not 
discourage a potential attack, it is unlikely that 
a U.S. guarantee would do so; a deterrence 
guarantee would make these satellites 
legitimate military targets; and a deterrence 
guarantee for non-U.S. assets would tend to 
not be credible, would decrease U.S. 
flexibility in crisis, and might be actively 
opposed by commercial, multi-national 
satellite operators. 
 
7. Become Potentially Less 
Dependent on Space 
 
Deterrence cannot be effective if an adversary 
believes he can gain decisive advantage on the 
battlefield by destroying or interrupting 
services from the U.S. space constellation. If 
he believes, on the other hand, that the U.S. 
will retain a decisive conventional and nuclear 
advantage even with interruption of space 
services, deterrence will be enhanced. 
Accordingly, the U.S. should inaugurate a 
multi-service effort to train and equip to fight 
without space. The recent “day without space” 
points the way. This may be initially an issue 
of consciousness-raising for field officers; 
what to do if the “screen goes blank.” 
 
8. Seize the Political Initiative 
 
The U.S. should be the leader in building 
consensus for measures to create a stable and 
predictable environment in space; no other 
power can take the lead, none has more to 
gain. The U.S. has been the leader in space 
debris mitigation, but has yielded the initiative 
to others on “rules of the road” and on space 
arms control, insisting instead on a “freedom 
of action,” which is in any case largely 
illusory given the thicket of regulatory 
regimes to which the U.S. is party. 
 
Accordingly, the U.S. should: 
• Sponsor an international regime on rules 
of the road in the UN Committee on 
Disarmament. 
• Propose a verifiable ban on KE ASAT 
testing in space. 
• Formalize consultations with the 
Europeans on space within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
• Actively pursue a series of discussions on 
space with the PRC. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The present U.S. space deterrence posture is 
problematic.  We have increased our space 
capability, but increased as well the potential 
benefit to an attacker of destroying or 
disabling that capability.  We have improved 
bilateral cooperation with some allies; but we 
have not rallied international support for the 
fundamental principles of our space policy.  
Our efforts to slow the transfer of space 
technology to potential adversaries have not 
prevented the emergence of counter space 
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capabilities elsewhere, and may have 
weakened our own space technological base.  
We have moved tentatively toward deploying 
more and cheaper satellites, but our core effort 
remains concentrated on a few, large, very 
expensive and difficult to defend systems – 
that will still be the backbone of our space 
constellation for decades to come.   In defense 
of our freedom of action in space, we have 
worked to discredit legal or political 
impediments to the testing of ASAT weapons 
by others, without overcoming the theoretical, 
political or budgetary obstacles to testing such 
systems ourselves.  
 
Although, as we have argued here, deterrence 
in never assured, the optimal approach for the 
U.S. in space is a “layered” approach, which 
combines the strengths of a number of 
deterrence strategies, avoids the weaknesses 
of each in isolation (especially in space), and 
deterrence, which combines the strengths of 
mutually reinforcing deterrence strategies 
while ensuring – as perhaps the key element in 
any space deterrence posture – that the U.S. 
can “fight through” even if deterrence fails, 
i.e. that our terrestrial forces will not be 
paralyzed even if the screen goes blank. 
 
This outcome cannot be achieved by assuming 
that space capabilities can only be replaced 
with space capabilities.  It cannot be achieved 
if an adversary assumes that retaliation for 
attacks on space capabilities will be limited to 
space.  It cannot be achieved if our forward 
planning does not account for interruption of 
space capability just at those times –on those 
fields of battle - where it is most necessary.  
And it cannot be achieved if the United States 
isolates itself technologically and politically, 
allowing others to establish the political 
agenda for space. 
           
New forms of deployment with more 
emphasis on defense may eventually solve the 
vulnerability problem and with it, the problem 
of deterrence.  President Reagan’s vision of a 
defensive arms race may be applicable to 
space as well, but that won’t happen in the 
medium term.  In sum, the Roman consul 
Flavius Vegetius Renatus is remembered for 
the phrase: if you would have peace, prepare 
for war.  Our conclusions can be summarized 
in a similar phrase: if you would have peace in 
space, prepare for war without it.   
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A Good Starting Point for Deterrence 
 
Dean Cheng 
CNA 
A central focus for much of the Cold War was 
determining what would deter the Soviet 
Union; this was a topic upon which many of 
the West’s best and brightest labored to 
determine. In order to deter the former Soviet 
Union, a huge intellectual edifice was erected, 
which helped guide a variety of military 
programs, including not only the American 
strategic triad of land-based and sea-based 
missiles and manned bombers, but tactical 
nuclear weapons, hardened command and 
control, and space-based early warning 
systems. It also incorporated concepts, such as 
“extended deterrence,” “escalation 
dominance,” and “mutual assured 
destruction.” 
 
Unfortunately, much of this effort turned out 
to be problematic. Although the Soviets 
accepted the concept of deterrence, they did 
not develop a counterpart to the intricate 
Western theories associated with deterrence, 
including such elements as selective targeting 
or deliberate escalation. Nor did they accept 
the idea that vulnerability was desirable for 
reasons of strategic stability – a cornerstone of 
“mutual assured destruction.”39 
 
In discussing the prospects for space 
deterrence, the authors exhibit the strengths 
and weaknesses of this legacy. The paper as 
                                                
CNA is a non-profit research organization that operates the 
Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Public 
Research. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author. Address correspondence to: Dean Cheng, (703) 281-
1083 (telephone), deanbcheng@gmail.com (e-mail). 
 
39See John Battilega, “Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The 
Post-Cold War Interviews,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Getting 
MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and 
Practices (Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 159-160. 
presented builds atop the long tradition of 
deterrence theory and writings, and provides 
an excellent overview of potential approaches 
and policy responses. But it also exhibits 
certain key limitations. 
 
One limitation is the decision to restrict the 
discussion of deterrence to a focus on space-
based systems. While the need to bound the 
problem is understandable, it raises the 
fundamental question of whether those who 
would be deterred will necessarily function 
within the same boundaries and constraints. 
While perhaps beyond the scope of this 
specific commentary, the matter of space 
deterrence needs to incorporate the ability to 
deter attacks against the entire space 
infrastructure, including systems in orbit, 
terrestrial launch and mission support 
facilities, as well as the communications and 
data channels that link all these elements 
together. 
 
The other limitation echoes the problems of 
Cold War deterrence; namely, whether all the 
relevant states upon which space deterrence is 
expected to apply actually share a common set 
of beliefs and values. Upon this rests such key 
assumptions as whether both sides are likely 
to pursue “prudent” courses of action in 
peacetime or in crisis, whether the status quo 
is considered acceptable (and therefore is the 
preferred state of affairs) or whether there 
exist “red lines” and how identifiable they 
may be. 
 
Specifically in the case of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), it is worth 
considering whether their concepts of 
deterrence and those of the United States are 
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compatible. For example, People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) authors discuss in their textbooks 
the utility of undertaking anti-satellite (ASAT) 
tests as a means of establishing the credibility 
of deterrence. They also note that the costs of 
replacing space systems may help coerce an 
opponent, as coercion is an integral part of 
Chinese conceptions of deterrence.40 This is a 
very different perspective from that of the 
authors of the deterrence study. Similarly, 
despite being a member of the Inter-Agency 
Space Debris Coordinating Committee 
(IADC), the PRC was not “deterred by 
entanglement” from engaging in the January 
2007 ASAT test in the first place. 
 
Such issues, however, serve to highlight the 
importance of a careful study of the issue of 
space deterrence, and to do so from more than 
just an American perspective. The study by 
the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies serves as an excellent starting point 
for such an effort. 
                                                
40Xianqi Chang, Military Astronautics (Defense Industries 
Press, People’s Republic of China, 2005), 209-304. 
 
Strengthening Deterrence: Assuring Delivery of Space Capabilities 
 
Peter L. Hays 
 
The  Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies’ report on “Space Deterrence: 
The Delicate Balance of Risk” briefly 
overviews fundamental deterrence concepts 
and evaluates how deterrence functioned 
during the Cold War; it masterfully assesses 
the most relevant and applicable lessons for 
today’s space deterrence challenges. The 
report comprehensively and multi-
dimensionally addresses space deterrence by 
discussing key issues, including the 
vulnerability gap the United Sates faces with 
respect to space capabilities, the difficulty of 
defense, problems with credibility of 
retaliation in an asymmetric environment, and 
weaknesses in space situational awareness 
(SSA) and attribution. It also makes key 
recommendations to develop internal red 
lines, improve defenses, deploy in more 
responsive and defensible modes, expand 
military use of commercial constellations, 
lower dependency on space, seize the political 
initiative, and improve SSA. Together, the 
assessment and recommendations provide a 
very solid foundation for strengthening 
deterrence and assuring delivery of space 
capabilities that have become increasingly 
important for modern military operations and 
the global economy. In addition, there are 
other areas that may warrant further emphasis, 
discussion, and evaluation of how they could 
also contribute to space deterrence, including 
a fuller assessment and understanding of 
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superpower space and deterrence issues, 
development of a better shared understanding 
of space deterrence issues within the U.S. 
Government and with key allies and potential 
adversaries, and exploration of ways to add 
additional layers and dimensions to deterrence 
by including more focus on humanity’s longer 
term costs and benefits of spacepower, such as 
debris mitigation and planetary defense. 
 
The United States and Soviet Union devoted 
considerable time and resources to 
understanding one another, communicating 
clearly, and developing robust mutual 
deterrence. Yet as revealed by the opening of 
Soviet archives at the end of the Cold War, the 
superpowers often perceived things quite 
differently and it is not clear they ever reached 
shared understanding on key nuclear and 
space issues. Important areas with an apparent 
lack of shared understanding include the role 
of strategic defenses, escalation thresholds, 
and space as a sanctuary. 
 
Consider, for example, that the Soviets 
launched a still somewhat mysterious 90-ton 
battle station in May 1987 that never reached 
proper orbit, but might have changed the 
strategic balance; and that their plans for war 
in Europe called for widespread initial nuclear 
strikes. This lack of shared understanding 
should inspire caution both with respect to 
U.S.-Russian relations and development of 
robust deterrence with other states, such as 
China. The United States needs to have 
modest expectations about its ability to 
develop robust deterrence, continuously 
question its fundamental assumptions, and 
work more explicitly on improving shared 
perceptions and understanding. 
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A related area requiring more emphasis and 
attention has been revealed throughout the Air 
Force Schriever War Game, and especially by 
the Schriever V game completed in March 
2009: the need for whole of government, 
whole of nation, and the whole of coalition 
approaches to deterrence. This calls for 
developing and implementing effective 
methods to use all government tools of power, 
harnessing related efforts throughout the 
nation, and finding ways to achieve better 
unity of effort across coalitions. 
 
But just as the United States and the Soviet 
Union lacked shared understanding of some 
foundational issues, there is not solid 
understanding or shared perception of key 
issues across the government, nation, and 
coalition. This reduces options and weakens 
deterrence, especially when more detailed and 
nuanced options for signaling or 
communicating commitment are desired. The 
U.S. Government must not only work harder 
internally to develop shared perceptions and 
understanding, perhaps through use of “crisis 
games” in addition to war games, but should 
also consider the best ways to be more 
proactive in opening peacetime dialogue with 
key allies and potential adversaries since it is 
it is very unlikely effective shared perceptions 
can be developed in real time in the midst of a 
crisis or conflict. 
 
Finally, the United States and all spacefaring 
actors must think more creatively about using 
spacepower to transcend traditional and 
emerging deterrence challenges. Parts of 
deterrence can help to illuminate paths 
towards and develop incentives to create a 
better future. Space, perhaps more than any 
other medium, is inherently linked to 
humanity’s future and very survival. We need 
to link these ideas together and better 
articulate ways spacepower can light a path 
towards genuinely cooperative approaches for 
protecting the Earth and space environments 
from debris and other threats, generating 
wealth and harvesting energy in space, and 
ultimately developing capabilities to improve 
the odds for humanity’s survival by becoming 
a multi-planetary species. Some progress has 
been made, but there have also been setbacks, 
such as the long-lived debris created by the 
high-altitude Chinese anti-satellite weapon 
test in January 2007. Keys to improving 
progress in this area include changing 
perceptions towards acceptance of the serious 
nature of the shared threats humanity faces, 
understanding that they require cooperative 
solutions, and recognizing the potential 
benefits through cooperation in harvesting 
energy from space and generating wealth in 
space. 
 
Deter War, Not Attacks Against Space Systems 
 
John B. Sheldon 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
The “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance 
of Risk” study by the Eisenhower Center for 
Space and Defense Studies has much merit to 
it. First, to undertake the task at all is 
praiseworthy given the enormity and 
importance of the topic. Second, the study 
contains many sensible points, ranging from 
the uncertain nature of deterrence to measures 
needed to physically protect space systems 
that policy makers and students of strategy 
would do well to note. But as noteworthy as 
the Space Deterrence study is, there are two 
wider points to consider that are not found in 
its pages. The omission of these points are not 
necessarily the fault of the authors of the 
study, given the parameters set out by the 
study’s sponsor, but they are worth pondering 
nonetheless. 
 
First, the aim of the study is perhaps overly 
ambitious. There is no guarantee that 
deterrence will work, but there are many 
things a state can do to maximize its chances 
of success in the deterrence mission. 
Maximizing the chances of success, however, 
is incredibly resource demanding, and not just 
in terms of materiel and finances. For 
example, in order to give deterrence a fair 
chance of success, sustained, disciplined, and 
focused political will is required. Such a 
commodity is not always in abundance, 
especially if politicians do not care about the 
stakes or have convinced themselves that 
deterrence does not require political support41 
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Such a commitment of scarce resources is 
only plausible if the political stakes are high 
enough, and as a result it is doubtful if policy 
makers are truly serious about deterring 
attacks against space systems. Instead, such a 
massive undertaking is best done in the 
service of vital policy interests, such as 
utilizing a state’s entire military capability (to 
include space systems), diplomatic acumen, 
and economic power in combination to deter 
other states from attacking United States 
territories and interests. Deterrence must be 
considered holistically, not just in terms of 
particular technologies. 
 
Second, even if one were to accept the notion 
that scarce resources be spent on deterring 
attacks against one particular part of the U.S. 
military’s vast capabilities, there is a woeful 
lack of thinking in policy circles about the 
very real prospect of deterrence failure. The 
United States could devote massive resources 
to space protection measures and invest a 
great deal of political will to deter attacks 
against space systems, yet all of this may well 
come to nothing. Adversaries may still feel 
that their best chance of success against 
overwhelming U.S. military might is to attack 
U.S. space systems despite efforts to deter 
against such attacks. In the face of this kind of 
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deterrence failure, what would the United 
States do? One way to avoid such a scenario is 
to strive for mission success without space 
systems in all defense planning and exercises 
– an effort that may have a deterrent value in-
and-of-itself. 
 
Lastly, as worthy as the Space Deterrence 
study is, one cannot help but hold the 
suspicion that the powers that ultimately 
approved the Space Deterrence study may 
have been looking at deterrence as a cheap 
way out of the thorny issue of space 
protection. Naturally, this author would be 
happy to be proven wrong about this 
suspicion, but if there is but a sliver of truth to 
the charge then policy makers should beware 
the temptation of using deterrence as an 
abrogation of strategic thinking. Space 
protection is essential for the future well being 
of U.S. space power and will not come cheap. 
 
Air Force Space Command Perspective on Space Deterrence 
 
Mike Manor and Kurt Neuman 
United States Air Force Space Command 
The  Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies embarked on an ambitious 
project when they tackled the subject of space 
deterrence. The end result is a comprehensive 
report that provides an excellent summary of 
changes in the strategic space environment, as 
well as a perceptive analytical framework for 
assessing deterrence options. The layered 
strategy – International Norms, Entanglement, 
Retaliation, and Denial – is an original model 
that nicely captures vital aspects of space 
deterrence. Closing out the report are 
recommendations that are practical and 
cogent, offering clear steps for improving the 
deterrent posture of the United States in space. 
 
While one of the most complete studies on the 
subject yet produced, there exist areas of this 
complex discussion that are worth further 
exploration and additional debate. Most 
notably, the Eisenhower Center’s study does 
not address actions relating to subnational and 
nonstate actors and the tremendous impact 
they could have on national security concerns 
and economic well being. The study assumes 
the list of potential actors with the motive and 
capability to attack the U.S. in space is small, 
and that the most likely scenario is a state 
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using space attacks as a precursor to greater 
engagement in conflict. This approach clouds 
a critical element of space deterrence: namely, 
how do we deter the full spectrum of threats to 
the capability and benefits provided by space, 
not merely near-peer attacks on space systems 
themselves? 
 
Subnational and Nonstate Actors 
 
Our experience in war gaming shows space to 
be an attractive target for a wide range of 
actors. Terrorists, corporations that may 
pursue espionage and sabotage, and other 
states at war with each other –  there are many 
possible scenarios where an adversary 
damages U.S. assets that are not on the field of 
battle. Effective space weapons can be 
acquired with relative ease and low cost. 
Subnational actors or individuals can build 
global positioning system (GPS) and mobile 
satellite communication jamming devices for 
less than $7,500 from components on the open 
market.42 The subsequent effect of low-cost 
weaponry is vastly disproportionate as 
compared to the potential to damage millions 
of dollars of equipment and severely hamper 
U.S. power projection capabilities. 
 
The rise of piracy in other domains suggests 
the likelihood that the same threat may affect 
the space domain.43 Space piracy could take 
the form of stealing satellite communication 
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bandwidth or jamming a communications 
signal with the potential to inflict heavy costs 
on commercial providers; furthermore, just 
like pirates at sea, space pirates could extort 
ransoms from these companies to stop the 
attacks. The proliferation of low-cost 
technologies and the knowledge to use them in 
a potentially harmful manner make space 
piracy a real possibility. 
 
In addition, attribution remains extremely 
problematic and it is likely that subnational 
actors would assume they could inflict 
significant harm without verifiable detection. 
In China, for example, the controversial Falun 
Gong spiritual group successfully jammed 
television broadcasts on multiple occasions, 
with one outage lasting eight days. During this 
time they were able to transmit propaganda 
messages over the hijacked communications 
satellite, including videos denouncing the 
government. The source of the jamming was 
never discovered. 
 
The Eisenhower Center study also does not 
consider the possibility of a subnational attack 
on terrestrial-based space architecture. The 
significant cost of building, maintaining, and 
operating ground facilities often drives the 
decision to centralize the operations of 
multiple space systems into consolidated 
centers. Although such decisions decrease 
cost, they sacrifice survivability and increase 
susceptibility to attack. Ground antennas are 
often in remote locations, geographically 
spread across the globe, and difficult to 
secure. These factors make the ground 
architecture a tempting target and the U.S. 
must consider how it could deter an attack on 
these assets. 
 
Even the proposed strategy of entanglement 
could be a high motivational factor for a 
nonstate actor. In general, the goal of 
extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, is to 
disrupt Western influence and harm 
industrialized states. The economic 
interdependence of developed states may offer 
an attractive target at a disproportionately low 
cost. 
 
The significance of such actions to U.S. 
interests is that even a persistent harassment 
campaign could have an impact to national 
security and economic well-being. As is often 
noted, over 80% of US military satellite 
communications in theater is carried over 
commercial satellites.44 U.S. banking and 
transportation systems are heavily dependent 
on GPS capabilities. Even something as 
seemingly innocuous as a single individual on 
a corporate sabotage campaign could result in 
widespread national economic and global 
impacts. When considering terrorists that may 
attempt to systematically harm the U.S. 
economy and national security, the 
repercussions could be even greater. 
 
The conventional wisdom is that most 
nonstate actors cannot be deterred as they hold 
little of value beyond extremist ideology. 
However, some would argue that “irrational” 
actors can be deterred with a holistic approach 
considering all elements of national power. As 
Lani Kass explains, “the lack of readily 
apparent pressure points does not mean 
nonstate actors are unable to weigh costs and 
benefits, it simply means new pressure points 
need to be discovered or developed.”45 Once 
found, the appropriate capabilities coupled 
with manifest intent must be applied, creating 
perception in the minds of nonstate actors that 
costs outweigh benefits – in classical 
deterrence theory fashion. 
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Cooperation and Military Entanglement 
 
The authors provide an outstanding discussion 
of economic, technological, and physical 
entanglement, but further examination can be 
focused on “military entanglement.” The 
Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system 
provides a real-world example. In return for a 
percentage of the system’s bandwidth, 
Australia provides funding for one additional 
satellite. In this case, an attack on the U.S. 
portion of WGS would equally be an attack on 
Australia as well. It is not clear whether this 
improves the deterrent posture of the U.S., but 
the development and use of common satellite 
communications standards, protocols, and 
equipment will certainly make for a more 
effective and ready coalition force, which, in 
turn, contributes to the deterrent calculus. 
 
Military entanglement and an effective 
international governance mechanism could 
also provide leverage to quell potential 
conflict prior to escalation, communicate the 
consequences of irresponsible behavior, and 
demonstrate a credible threat of repercussion. 
If sufficient international support was 
garnered in a space-related coalition, 
responses could be expanded to the extent of 
cooperative global denial of access to space 
services (international launch facilities, 
industry and manufacturing capabilities, 
global sensors, and space debris collision 
analysis, etc.) and the multitude of benefits 
space provides. 
 
In addition to traditional engagement with our 
allies, there may be deterrent value through 
purposeful entanglement with those states 
generally considered to be adversaries. For 
example, sharing transponders on a 
commercial communications satellite with 
Iran or North Korea may deter those countries 
from jamming attempts to avoid interference 
with their own signal. Furthermore, the 
pervasiveness of GPS equipment in foreign 
military systems is another example of 
military entanglement, as other states may be 
reluctant to jam signals that would degrade 
their own capabilities. Providing assurances 
for GPS signal availability to our friends and 
allies will discourage the development of 
competing systems, while remaining 
ambiguous with potential adversaries 
increases the U.S. space deterrence posture. 
 
United States Industrial Base 
 
Industrial base concerns are briefly mentioned 
in the report; however, a more in-depth 
examination of the relationship to deterrence 
is beneficial. Currently, International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) limits the 
exportation of sensitive satellite technology.46 
While these provisions were intended to 
protect U.S. technological advantage, they 
have eroded U.S. competitiveness in foreign 
markets and provided a catalyst for 
development of foreign space manufacturing 
capability.47 
The U.S. must foster greater dependence on 
domestic manufactured goods, while 
continuing to protect those “crown jewels” of 
highly advanced technological innovation. 
The need to strengthen the U.S. industrial base 
is a common thread that runs through all four 
layers of the study’s deterrence model. The 
consolidation of the U.S. aerospace industry 
resulted in fewer companies competing for 
fewer contracts, and employing many less 
engineers and scientists. Recent studies have 
gone so far as to say that American defense 
and aerospace companies are quickly 
approaching a day when they can no longer 
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deliver the kinds of combat systems needed by 
the military.48 
 
Reduction in the number of space experts and 
restrictions in export controls have also led to 
difficulty in maintaining effective production 
in the foundational parts and supply sectors of 
the Aerospace/Defense industry. The second-
tier and third-tier vendors have been 
particularly affected, driving some sources of 
critical parts to be manufactured overseas.49 
Numerous instances of substandard parts have 
impacted delivery schedules, resulting in 
higher program costs and delays. A weak 
industrial base tends to discount perceptions 
that the U.S. will have the ability to act 
unilaterally in space in the future, leading to a 
weak deterrent posture. Meanwhile, bolstering 
the industrial base sends a clear signal that the 
U.S. will be the long-term leader in 
innovation, technology development, and 
space expertise. 
 
Counter-Value Strategy 
 
In the future, it will be necessary to develop a 
more holistic approach to space deterrence 
that leverages the complete set of national 
capabilities   economic, diplomatic, legal, 
social, information, and conventional military 
forces. Allowances must be made for 
deterrence across a complete spectrum of 
threats, from radical subnational actors to 
nuclear armed states. A range of options is 
needed, as solely an in-kind response to an 
attack on U.S. space systems is unlikely to be 
in our best interest. In the case of subnational 
or nonstate adversaries, they would most 
likely not have any space assets of their own 
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and the US would not be able to retaliate in a 
similar manner. 
 
Instead, the U.S. must develop some form of 
“counter-value” strategy for retaliation that 
takes advantage of all instruments of national 
power. The study only briefly mentions the 
possibility of responding in terms of non-
space capabilities, when in fact a non-space 
response would be the most probable starting 
proposition. Michael Krepon presents an 
excellent argument for conventional strikes in 
retaliation to an attack on U.S. space 
systems.50 The arguments for whole-of-
government responses tailored to each 
adversary must move to the forefront of 
thinking as they represent the most likely 
scenario when confronting hostile actions in 
space. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The complexities of today’s world have 
exposed the limitations of traditional 
deterrence theory. The breakdown of bi-
polarity and the subsequent dispersion of 
global power centers, to include the 
resurgence of nonstate and subnational actors, 
have multiplied both the objects and the 
mechanisms of deterrence. While it is true that 
the essence of deterrence has not changed – it 
is still the product of capability, will, and 
perception – the new multiplicity of variables 
have rendered old strategies inadequate.51 
 
Deterrence strategy is often more art than 
science. In the case of space deterrence, 
failure could have wide-ranging and highly 
destructive effects. This relationship points to 
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the importance of continued debate and in-
depth examination of the topic. The study and 
work of the Eisenhower Center provide a solid 
foundation for this debate and a strong 
analytical framework for further analysis. 
 
An Alternative View on Space Deterrence 
 
Dwight D. Rauhala and Jonty L. Kasku-Jackson 
 
The authors of the “Space Deterrence” report 
provide  thoughtful, common sense 
recommendations to strengthen space 
deterrence, and given the complexity of 
deterrence, provide a “layered defense” 
strategy. The first recommendation given was 
to improve space situational awareness (SSA). 
As the authors acknowledge, these 
recommendations are not “cost constrained.” 
Although this and other recommendations 
bear consideration, one difficult task will be in 
addressing potential costs. The next 
recommendation is to develop internal red 
lines, a system by which internal alerts 
provide notifications to the “national 
command authority.”  (National Command 
Authorities was a term that referred 
collectively to the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of Defense.  The term 
was discontinued in 2002.52  The singular 
term, “national command authority,” was not 
an officially accepted term, although often 
(mis-) used since, individually, the President 
was, and is more correctly referred to as the 
President or Commander-in-Chief.). The third 
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recommendation refers to enhancing the 
ability to defend against threats to the 
capability that space systems provide; little 
specificity is given. Given the proliferation of 
jammers and other disruptive technologies and 
efforts (e.g., cyber and so forth) this 
recommendation needs to be further defined. 
Next, the authors recommend deploying space 
assets in “inherently more defensible modes.” 
Fifth, the authors recommend “operational 
responsiveness.” They largely discount the 
efficacy of the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD’s) concept of “Operationally 
Responsive Space,” as was defined by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense in his 2007 
memorandum by that title and reported in the 
DOD’s 2007 Report to the United States 
Congress.53 Sixth, “expand military use of the 
commercial constellation” to complicate 
targeting options by a potential adversary is 
recommended. This is not without issue, since 
one might argue that this also serves to 
increase the risk that   and potentially lower 
the threshold by which   a commercial system 
will be targeted, which raises many 
implications regarding commercial assets 
becoming military targets. Seventh, “become 
potentially less dependent on space” is 
advanced. If a state can afford to better 
proliferate capabilities among space and non-
space assets, this naturally complicates an 
adversary’s attack plan; however, it does not 
come without significant opportunity costs 
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and/or the willingness to expend resources on 
alternate capabilities that may not be as well 
suited as those that can be provided by space 
assets. 
 
In light of the recommendations considered 
above, we suggest, that in order to examine 
the validity of the recommendations, 
definitions used need to be clarified to 
adequately address the issues and aspects of 
space deterrence. We also contend that the 
assumptions on which the recommendations 
are made may be flawed, and we provide 
below alternative views to their assumptions 
for further consideration and study. 
 
Contested Space 
 
The authors acknowledge that “contested 
space” does not have a single, agreed upon 
definition; we argue that to discuss contested 
space, a definition must be given nonetheless. 
Additionally, we assert that contested space is 
much broader than overtly attacking part of 
the space architecture or interrupting one’s 
ability to exploit it. It must also extend to all 
that comprises a state’s space enterprise   the 
laws and policies, the domestic and 
international industrial environment, 
diplomacy, and any other enterprise, activity, 
or consideration that potentially enables or 
jeopardizes the exploitation of space 
activities.54 If one considers the basic 
dictionary definition of “contest,” which is a 
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“struggle for superiority or victory, then we 
further claim that space has been contested 
since the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, when the U.S .and Soviet Union began 
their activities in space in earnest.55 Certainly, 
these activities were exemplified by the 1957 
launch of Sputnik followed closely by the U.S. 
launch of Explorer I.56 
 
As our own national space policies 
acknowledge, the importance of the U.S. 
commercial/industrial sector to long-term 
national security cannot be overestimated.57 In 
a broader sense, contested space ought to be 
defined so as to include those activities that 
challenge a state’s efforts to gain prominence, 
influence, and potentially predominance in 
space. Naturally, this would affect a state’s 
elements of national power. As stated, we 
believe a narrower view of contested space, 
such as overt military efforts to disrupt or 
damage a space asset in space, is far too 
narrow a view. In encompassing a broader 
view, one can better understand a given 
geopolitical context for the activities in space 
and attendant implications. Whereas direct 
action against a space object provides one 
basis for analyzing immediate effects, longer-
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the maximum extent, consistent with national security. 
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term implications can better be assessed by 
looking at the broader view. 
 
Given the premise that space has been 
contested since the birth of the space age, 
following the Second World War, the 
underlying reasons for U.S. and Soviet Union 
efforts to gain access to space may have been 
multifaceted – the initial efforts of the U.S. for 
purposes of national security, and the Soviet 
Union perhaps more focused on national 
prestige. Although U.S. Presidential policies 
addressed the right of freedom to use space 
unimpeded and the Soviet Union’s somewhat, 
but not complete, acquiescence to that fact, 
both states developed and demonstrated a 
variety of counterspace capabilities, to include 
nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.58 Even 
though neither has attacked the other’s space 
assets with kinetic ASAT systems, we 
maintain that the relationship between the two 
superpowers was one of a restrained contested 
nature. 
 
Since that time, nearly 12 states have achieved 
varying levels of space launch capabilities and 
more than 30 states and entities have satellites 
registered with the United Nations (UN).59 
When one also takes a look at emerging small 
satellite (smallsat) technologies, such as those 
developed by Surrey Satellite Technology of 
the United Kingdom (UK),60 cooperative 
efforts among states, and commercially 
                                                
58R. Cargill Hall, “The Evolution of U.S. National Security 
Space Policy and its Legal Foundations in the 20th Century,” 
Journal of Space Law 33 (2007); and Laura Grego, “Short 
History of U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs” (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 1 April, 2003). For Grego’s article see: 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/asat_history.p
df (accessed August 2009). 
59See United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org (accessed August 2009). This 
Office captures the states that have signed up to the 
Registration Convention. The signatories to this Convention 
agree to register their satellites at a time following their 
launch and orbital insertion. 
60See http://www.sstl.co.uk (accessed August 2009). 
available space capabilities, the number of 
states exploiting space now and the near future 
will continue to grow at a significant space. 
With proliferated capabilities and access, the 
interests in using and potentially denying 
space capabilities also become more 
proliferated. More insidiously, states will 
continue to seek and develop counterspace 
activities and methodologies for countering 
space systems. Some of these methodologies 
may be destructive, others not. As opposed to 
the authors’ view, we contend that nonstate 
entities will also seek ways to counter the 
utility of U.S. and other states’ space 
capabilities. 
 
One also often overlooks the role of the 
industrial sector when addressing contested 
space. The U.S. industrial sector once 
dominated this area, but no more. 
International consortia and technologies have 
proliferated. With greater international 
competition, the space-related sector has 
tended to become more consolidated with, in 
the U.S. and European cases, fewer surviving 
large “space” companies and a greater reliance 
on imported components.61 This, combined 
with countries’ policies that have enabled or 
constrained their respective industrial sectors’ 
competitiveness will greatly affect the national 
security not only now, but in the longer term 
as well. 
 
The United States is Not 
Uniquely Reliant on Space 
 
Closely related to the definition of “contested 
space” is the assertion by the authors that the 
U.S. is “uniquely reliant” on space. According 
to the dictionary, “unique” is defined as 
                                                
61See Annual Capabilities Report to Congress (Office of 
Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics Industrial Policy, March 2009), 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/annual_ind_cap_rpt_to_congr
ess-2009.pdf (accessed August 2009). 
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“being the only one” or “being without a like 
or equal.”62 While it is true that U.S. space 
capabilities far surpass most states, it is not 
true that the U.S. is the only state that uses 
space capabilities – especially if one considers 
those capabilities within the 20-year period 
suggested by the Eisenhower Center study. 
China currently conducts the same range of 
activities in space as the U.S. with the 
exception of space-based missile warning.63 
The European Union (EU) clearly indicates its 
position of “strategic independence” regarding 
critical space capabilities.64 Japan changed its 
laws in 2007 to allow significantly increased 
development and reliance on space 
capabilities.65 
 
Clearly the U.S., while more reliant on space-
based capabilities, is not uniquely reliant on 
space capabilities. Also, as mentioned above, 
one must remember that even though a 
country may not possess an indigenous 
capability to manufacture and/or launch its 
own satellites, the commercial market allows 
states to buy communication, remote sensing, 
                                                
62The definition of “unique” stated herein is from Merriam 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th edition, Merriam-
Webster Incorporated, 2003). 
63See the following: Annual Report to Congress, Military 
Power of the Peoples Republic of China (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2009), 25-28, located at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power
_Report_2009.pdf (accessed August 2009); and Larry 
Wortzel and Dean Cheng, China’s Military Ambitions in 
Space (George Marshall Institute, Washington D.C., 2006), 
10-11. Both reports discuss China’s intent to increase both its 
space capabilities and its reliance on those capabilities. The 
Department of Defense report time frame is the next 20 years, 
while the Wortzel and Cheng article addresses China’s current 
5-year plan. 
64White Paper, Space: A new European frontier for an 
expanding Union, An action plan for implementing the 
European Space Policy (published by the European 
Commission, European Communities, 2003), 
http://galileo.khem.gov.hu/documents/angol/eus_dokumentu
mok/white_paper_on_european_space_policy.pdf (accessed 
August 2009). 
65Hashimoto Nobuaki, Establishment of the Basic Space Law 
– Japan Space Security Policy 123 (National Institute for 
Defense Studies, July 2008. 
and navigation capabilities – essentially 
allowing non-spacefaring states to rely on 
space. Finally, we contend that typically, 
space capabilities are currently merely a 
means to gain information superiority in order 
to conduct successful terrestrial operations. 
Although the US is more reliant on space 
capabilities for this information superiority 
than others, it still retains non-space means of 
attaining information superiority. 
 
Irrationality 
 
In order to fully enter into a discussion of 
deterrence, irrationality must be defined –
since when attempting to deter a potential 
adversary or competitor, one might better 
approach a more effective deterrence strategy 
if the target adversary is rational. That is not 
to say that there is a valid deterministic theory 
that can provide an “if, then” formula. The 
authors state, “the history of strategic policy is 
replete with examples of nominally rational 
actors behaving irrationally.” If your 
adversary responds to your action in an 
unpredictable manner, is he/she acting in an 
irrational manner? 
 
We contend that it is not necessarily so. In his 
book, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence 
and a New Direction, Keith Payne makes a 
distinction between an actor who is 
unreasonable versus irrational. He also 
illustrates that the adversary’s actions can be 
very unpredictable despite the information one 
might have of that adversary.66 One difficulty 
is trying to think like the adversary. Even if 
one can approximate such, one risks peril to 
assume with any certainty that the adversary’s 
actions are predictable. This can be further 
complicated if the adversary intentionally 
                                                
66Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and 
a New Direction (The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 7-
15. Payne goes on to assert how difficult it is to determine 
how a potential adversary will react to deterrent attempts. 
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seeks to mislead or deceive, a tenet that is 
central to Chinese doctrine.67 
 
Deterrence 
 
The authors correctly point to the difficulty in 
deterring a potential adversary; that “one size 
does not fit all.” However, during their 
discussion of deterrence, they state, “that 
leaders feel impelled to proclaim red lines in 
the first place may be taken as a sign of 
ambiguity rather than resolve.” Does this 
mean declarative statements are not needed? 
What elements are needed for effective 
deterrence? First, if one has any significant 
prospect for deterring another, one must have 
a capability to act. Next, the potential 
adversary needs to believe one will act, should 
that adversary behave in an unacceptable 
manner. Third, the adversary must believe one 
has the resolve. One complicating factor to 
this deals with the stakes of the potential 
belligerents. 
 
We take a hypothetical situation to illustrate 
this. Say, hypothetically, a crisis has arisen 
between the People’s Republic of China and 
the United States due to Taiwanese leadership 
pushing for a constitutional change declaring 
independence and total sovereignty. For the 
Chinese Communist Party, this is seen as an 
unequivocal red line. This is an issue that is 
central to the Party’s legitimacy and long-term 
existence. Do the stakes rise to the same level 
for the United States and, almost as 
importantly, do the Chinese believe that the 
U.S. believes this critical to the existence of 
the U.S., its people, and the government? If 
there is a perceived mismatch between the 
levels of importance the stakes take, there is 
certainly a danger that deterrence efforts by 
                                                
67Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the Peoples 
Republic of China (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009), 
16-17. 
the entity with lesser stakes might not be very 
effective. Another complicating factor might 
be historical precedent by the actors. Recently, 
U.S. Administration leadership has stated that 
a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable and 
North Korea cannot be allowed to become a 
nuclear power. How is future credibility 
affected should North Korea fully realize its 
aspirations, regardless of the rhetoric? 
 
In somewhat of a contrast to the authors, we 
contend “red lines” are critical. Without them, 
the adversary might not understand the 
deterrent message one is trying to convey. It is 
true that how the red lines are communicated 
is critical. During the 1991 Nuclear Posture 
Review, the term “studied ambiguity” 
surfaced. This meant that the United States 
would not state when it would – or would not 
– use nuclear weapons, but reserved the right 
to consider any or all elements of military 
power, should the need arise.68 One might 
presume this also includes nuclear weaponry. 
A red line does not need to be constraining. 
Some argue Saddam Hussein misunderstood 
the United States’ position when he decided to 
invade Kuwait.69 Although it may not be 
advisable in certain situations to tell a 
potential adversary how one might act, it 
could be argued that the adversary needs to 
understand that one might effectively act and 
that the elements discussed above have been 
met. 
                                                
68NSPD-17/HSPD 4 [unclassified version]: National Strategy 
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (President Bush, 
December 2002). The unclassified version states: “The United 
States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to 
respond with overwhelming force – including potentially 
nuclear weapons – to the use of [weapons of mass 
destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and 
friends and allies.” See the following for more information: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html (accessed 
August 2009). 
69Andrew Rosenthal, “Confrontation in the Gulf: Washington 
Talk; Did U.S. Overtures Give Wrong idea to Hussein?” New 
York Times, 19 September 1990. 
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As we extend deterrence theory to space, it is 
absolutely critical that any discussion of 
deterrence addresses both the absolute and 
relative reliance of each player on space. If the 
U.S. were indeed as posited, “uniquely 
reliant” on space, then there would be nothing 
in space for the U.S. to hold at risk. The fact 
that the U.S. is currently more reliant on space 
than even its near-peer competitor China 
complicates deterrence calculations enough. 
Setting the stage and saying that only the U.S. 
would be severely affected by the loss of its 
space capabilities is alarmist, incorrect, and 
does nothing to further useful discussions on 
what could truly make deterrence in space 
possible. Furthermore, such a position 
continues to fail to address the necessity for 
the U.S. to understand its adversary. Although 
the authors discuss ensuring that U.S. 
adversaries understand U.S. intent, they 
completely disregard the equally important 
requirement that the U.S. understand its 
adversaries. In light of this ongoing U.S. 
failure, clearly communicated red lines 
become much more important. 
 
One additional term needs to be clarified when 
extending deterrence theory into space. While 
we commend the Eisenhower Center for 
creating an initial framework in which to 
discuss deterrence in a space context, we 
contend that key words are misused in such a 
way to further muddle rather than clarify 
issues. Of particular concern, is the word 
“denial.” In the space control realm, denial is 
part of the offensive space control mission 
area.70 Although the authors use “deny” as 
synonymous with “fighting through” an attack 
on U.S. space capabilities, for any involved in 
                                                
70See Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations (Department 
of the Army, Department of the Navy Marine Corps, 
Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force, 
United States of America, 6 January 2009), II-5, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf 
(accessed August 2009). 
the space world that choice of words is 
confusing and also politically charged. 
Essentially the authors are speaking of an 
adversary conducting an attack against U.S. 
space capabilities that is ineffective, either due 
to insufficient application of force against 
those targets or because of redundancy in U.S. 
space and non-space systems. No new 
terminology is required for that discussion and 
the use of “denial” actually impedes clarity. 
 
Economic Entanglements 
and International Norms 
 
The Eisenhower Center study seeks to add 
economic entanglements and international 
norms as part of deterrence theory as it applies 
to space. As noted above, deterrence is 
defined as possession of a deterrence force 
(military force) that can be applied externally 
to an adversary to prevent an undesired action. 
However, economic entanglements are 
internally generated by states in the normal 
course of actions, whereby the states enter into 
an economic relationship in order to further 
economic self-interest rather than to achieve a 
deterrent objective. Additionally, economic 
entanglements or relationships cannot be 
imposed on an unwilling party. In regard to 
international norms, international laws 
regarding space have no real enforcement 
mechanisms, and therefore there is no credible 
threat of unacceptable counteraction via a 
deterrent force. Although economic 
entanglements and international norms are not 
part of classic deterrence theory, that is not to 
say they are unimportant. On the contrary, 
economic entanglements, in particular, may 
prove to be a significant contributing factor in 
preventing undesirable activities in space. 
 
However, it is interesting that the Space 
Deterrence report’s position on making 
economic entanglements and international 
norms part of a space deterrence theory are 
similar to some Chinese authors who state: “It 
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is not sufficient to solely use physical 
counterattack mechanisms for deterrence in 
space. Capabilities must be paired with a wise 
strategy that includes important political and 
economic elements. Utilizing the full range of 
deterrent factors is the only way to maximize 
security advantage, while minimizing the 
possibility of conflict.”71 
 
Declaring Space Assets “Sovereign” 
is Impractical and Unnecessary 
 
Although states exercise sovereignty over the 
air space above their territories and the waters 
adjacent to their territories, the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967 specifically states that space is 
not subject to claims of sovereignty and that 
space objects remain under “jurisdiction and 
control” of the state.72 Sovereignty is generally 
understood to be a state exercising supreme 
power in and over its territory and over its 
population.73 Jurisdiction and control include 
the power of a state to legislate with respect to 
its space objects.74 Unlike some vessels and 
aircraft, space objects are not considered to be 
extensions of a state’s sovereignty. Although 
the National Space Policy of 1996 stated, 
“Purposeful interference with space systems 
shall be viewed as an infringement on 
sovereign rights,”75 the current National Space 
Policy of 2006 states, “the United States will 
view purposeful interference with its space 
                                                
71Bao Shixiu, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,” China 
Security 5: 1 (Winter 2007). 
72Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967, Articles II and VIII, 
respectively. 
73Peter P. C. Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and 
Outer Space: A Comparative Approach (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 15. 
74Ibid., 24 
75See Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8, 
National Space Policy, dated 14 September 1996, 
http://space.au.af.mil/histpol.htm (accessed August 2009). 
systems an infringement on its rights.”76 The 
U.S. has clearly moved away from declaring 
its space objects sovereign at a time when 
there is a growing perception that space is 
contested and that some sort of undesirable 
activity in space is more likely. 
 
We contend the U.S. recognizes that 
unilaterally declaring its space objects to be 
sovereign is of no value. Although it is 
theoretically possible to enter into agreements 
to declare space objects to be an extension of a 
state’s sovereignty, such an undertaking 
would take a significant amount of time and 
would not necessarily be of benefit. The 
language of the 2006 National Space Policy is 
likely to have been predicated on a number of 
factors; one such being the specific language 
of the Outer Space Treaty cited above. 
Another factor was likely to be practicality. 
The U.S. is able to meet its national security 
objectives without having to declare its space 
objects sovereign since it has jurisdiction and 
control of those objects, and in any case has a 
number of times refused to react militarily to 
violations of its sovereignty when that course 
of action best suited the situation.77 A third 
factor may be political – declaring a space 
object sovereign is extremely politically 
sensitive compared to the benefit gained. 
 
Additionally, if one extends application of 
sovereignty to its logical conclusion, then a 
number of other troublesome questions arise. 
When space objects are sovereign, what 
happens if they collide? Will space objects 
have a buffer zone equivalent to territorial 
                                                
76See the following: U.S. National Space Policy, 31 August 
2006, Office of Science and Technology Policy Fact Sheet, 
http://space.au.af.mil/histpol.htm (accessed August 2009). 
77Examples include: U.S. response to the taking of its 
embassy in Tehran, Iran in 1979; and U.S. response to the 
detention of the EP-3 aircraft by China in 2001. In neither 
case, did the U.S. feel compelled to begin military actions to 
respond to those perceived violations of U.S. sovereignty. 
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waters – and if so, how big? Is a physical 
action against that sovereign space object 
required for it to be considered a violation of 
sovereignty? When weighed against these 
issues it becomes clear that little, if any 
benefit, will accrue to outweigh the difficulties 
with first gaining consensus to declare space 
objects sovereign, and second developing the 
legal and monitoring regimes necessary to 
make such a construct work. Declaring space 
objects sovereign seems to us to be of little 
benefit to increasing the efficacy of deterrence 
and could be considered destabilizing as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have tried to accomplish two things in this 
commentary – (1) clarify the space deterrence 
lexicon; and (2) amend the assumptions so 
they can provide a realistic basis for 
examining space deterrence. We believe that 
once the assumptions are agreed upon, and the 
definitions are clarified and widely accepted 
the Eisenhower Center’s recommendations 
can be further examined on the basis of their 
merit. 
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